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Aymen Nader*

Providing Essential Services:
Canada's Constitutional
Commitment Under Section 36

This paper explores the history of constitutional negotiations that have led to the
entrenchment of section 36 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The author argues that
the intention of the federal proponents of this section was to entrench the federal
spending power. The author further demonstrates that section 36 entails notjust
constitutional recognition of the spending power, but also a constitutional commitment or obligation for the exercise of that power to provide "essentialpublic
services of a reasonable quality to all Canadians" s. 36 (1)(c).
Cette 6tude explore I'historiquedes negotiations constitutionnelles qui ont abouti
I 'enchissement de I'article 36 de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982. L'auteur
soutient que 'intention des proposeurs f6d6raux de cetarticle visaitI'ench~ssement
du pouvoir f6d6ral de d6penseret g~rerles fonds publics. IIdemontre que I'article
36 implique non seulement la reconnaissance du pouvoir de d6penser et g6rer
les fonds publics, mais aussi un engagement constitutionnel ou une obligation
pour que I'exercice de ce pouvoir de d~penser et gerer les fonds publics
"[fournisse] a tousles Canadiens, i un niveau de qualite acceptable, les services
publics essentiels": s. 36(1)(c).

The period of constitutional renewal in Canada which resulted in the
ConstitutionAct, 1982,' was inspired largely by the passing of Canada's
centennial, and by 1971 several provisions of the present Constitution
had already been substantially formulated, including the present section
36. The phrasing of this provision, however, was as challenging to
interpret then as it still is now. This section reads:
36(1) Without altering the legislative authority of Parliament or of the
provincial legislatures, or the rights of any of them with respect to
the exercise of their legislative authority, Parliament and the
legislatures, together with the government of Canada and the
provincial governments, are committed to
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(a) promoting equal opportunities for the well-being of Canadians;
(b) furthering economic development to reduce disparity in opportunities; and
(c) providing essential public services of reasonable quality to all
Canadians.
(2) Parliament and the government of Canada are committed to the
principle of making equalization payments to ensure that provincial
governments have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of
taxation.
The central challenge to interpreting this section lies in unlocking the
idiosyncracy in constitutional law which it appears to contain.
Section 36 commits the federal government and Parliament to providing essential public services. These services, however, were generally
regarded as falling within the authority of the provincial governments.
How then was the federal government to meet its commitment without
acting outside of its jurisdiction? Or, more directly, how was the federal
government going to meet its commitment without appearing to regulate
in the provincial domain? The answer to this dilemma was that the federal
government would only subsidize provincial expenditures in the areas of
essential public services and, in return, would have a say in the way
provinces delivered these services.
This arrangement, however, raised another constitutional problem: the
federal government did not have firm constitutional authority to spend its
money in areas not within itsjurisdiction, or at least this power, the federal
"spending power", was a hotly debated issue. In order to safeguard
national interests in the provision of essential public services, the federal
government would need to shore up its spending power, and constitutional renewal provided the ideal opportunity to do just that. This is the
history of section 36.
Today, that history collides with the federal retreat from its commitment to exercise its spending power under s. 36. Led by Prime Minister
Jean Chrdtien, the federal government is seeking to save seven billion
dollars through cuts in transfer payment which were, ab initio, designed
to subsidize essential provincial public services, primarily those of
health, education and welfare.2 This federal initiative, known as the
Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST), will significantly undermine
the viability of national standards in the social services area. Effective as
of April 1st, 1996, the CHST now allows provinces to roll back their

2. An Act to Implement CertainProvisionsof the Budget tabled in Parliamenton February

27, 1995, S.C. 1995, c. 17.
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delivery of welfare services by lifting the conditions which had, up until
that time, required provinces to make their social services accessible to
all in need, reasonable in terms of adequacy and comprehensiveness, and
subject to fairness through the availability of an appeal system. Depending on provincial budget planning strategies, welfare services may soon
vary widely from one province to another. Indeed, the CHST does not
even require provinces to set in place a welfare system of any kind as a
prerequisite to their receiving full federal funding, thus auguring the end
of national standards in the field of welfare services. The implications of
these structural changes in the delivery of social services may have a
significant impact on national unity, national identity, the mobility of
labour, and the health and well-being of Canadians living in poverty.
Section 36 of the ConstitutionAct, 1982 would appear at first glance
to ensure that essential public services of a reasonable quality will be
provided to all Canadians, in spite of the current climate of debt and
deficit reduction. Subsection 36(1)(c) in particular commits both levels
of government to providing essential public services of reasonable
quality to all Canadians. This would seem relatively straightforward.
Despite this obvious commitment, this section of the Constitution has
never formed the basis of a court action. Perhaps this is because, until
recently, the maintenance of social programmes had always been addressed as a priority by governments.
Overview
In order to provide a cogent interpretation of this section this inquiry will
examine the manner in which essential public services are provided to all
Canadians. Part I of this paper will follow the federal-provincial structure
of essential public service delivery in Canada and explore the attendant
problems, both practical and constitutional.
National standards in public services are achieved through the fiscal
mechanism of "conditional grants", federal money sent to the provinces
to pay for a portion of the cost of health, education and welfare (generally). Such a federal transfer to the provinces is necessary. The federal
government cannot itself provide these services because it is the provinces which have the constitutional jurisdiction for these social concerns,
according to the division of powers enumerated in the ConstitutionAct,
1867.3Thus, in return for a significant fiscal contribution to the provinces,
the federal government gains provincial compliance with certain federally determined conditions when delivering essential public services.

3. (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 [hereinafter Constitution Act 1867].
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"Conditional grants", then, serve to make essential public service delivery relatively uniform in Canada. Those conditions, which require the
provincial service in question to be broadly universal, accessible and
comprehensive,4 have (up until the CHST) ensured that Canadians right
across the country would enjoy the same or similar quality services.
Conditional grants, in short, significantly redressed the 'checkerboard'
standards which existed in essential public service delivery in Canada.
The authority which enables the federal government to effect these
conditional grants is its spending power. This power, however, is not
specifically referred to in the ConstitutionAct, 1867. As a result, federal
governments have historically derived their spending power from the
basis of more than one section of the Constitution. Such construction of
constitutional power was, of course, and still is, a much weaker authority
for the exercise of government power than if the authority were to be
specifically identified in the Constitution as expressly belonging to one
order of government or another.
In addition to the indirect nature of their authority, conditional grants
were also problematic because they cast the federal government in a role
of providingprovincialpublic services, services which fell clearly within
the ambit of provincial jurisdiction according to the 1867 constitutional
division of powers. Accordingly, the division of powers became a site of
dispute with respect to the spending power. On the one hand, the federal
government asserted that it had the power to spend for purposes on which
Parliament does not necessarily have the power to legislate-in spite of
the weak basis for that power. On the other hand, some provinces and
government critics viewed the use of the spending power to establish
conditional grants as an unconstitutional intrusion by the federal government into the provincial domain.
Faced with this situation at the time of the first major conditional grant
programmes in the late 1960s, the federal government acknowledged that
as long as the spending power was disputed, both its ability to establish
conditional grant programmes, as well as the continued survival of
existing programmes, would be in jeopardy. In other words, its very
undertaking to curtail regional disparities in public services by establishing "national standards" for them, was threatened by the dispute over the
constitutional validity of the spending power.

4. Although these conditions are specifically stated in the MedicalCareAct, 1966-67, c. 64,
they are also broad principles which apply to conditional grants in the social services. As The
Content of Governments' Commitment section of this paper will argue, these broad conditions
are implied in s. 36(1)(c) of the Constitution.
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The atmosphere of national rebirth around the time of Canada's 1967
centennial celebrations also proved to be a time of constitutional renewal,
and the opportunity was ripe for the federal government to shore up the
weak foundation of its spending power. The federal government believed
that if the spending power were provided for explicitly in a new constitution, then contention and uncertainty about continued federal participation in the provision of provincial public services would cease. Article 46
of the 1971 Victoria Charter became that provision.' It was also the first
version of the current s. 36.
Article 46 committed Parliament, the Government of Canada and the
legislatures and Governments of the provinces to the assurance that
essential public services would be available to all individuals in Canada;
these public services were specifically identified by the 1969 federal
government Working Paper on the Constitution6 as including the provincial areas of health, education and welfare. Yet, a commitment by
Parliament to participate in these fields for the purpose of "standardizing"
public services in order for all Canadiansto benefit necessarily implies
the use of conditional grants, the only device by which this goal can be
achieved. Authority for the making of conditional grants, in turn, derives
from the federal spending power. By recognizing that Parliament had a
role to play in the provincial fields of public services, then, this provision
in the Victoria Charter was intended to acknowledge indirectly the
federal spending power, at least to the extent of the promotion of equality
of opportunities, the availability of essential public services, and the
promotion of economic development, objects identified under paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) of Article 46.
The provision received substantial support from the provinces and
remained more or less unchanged until eight years later when, for the first
time, subsection (2) was added. 7 The history of this subsection belongs to
this period of intervening years. Once sufficient time had passed to ensure
the integration of conditional grants into provincial budget planning, the
open ended structure of these grants became a significant factor which
contributed to their burgeoning costs. From the federal perspective,
however, the ability to anticipate the extent of its contributions in any
given year became impossible because programme expenditures were
determined by the provinces.
In a variety of unilateral alterations and adjustments to the structure of
conditional and unconditional grant programmes in the 1970s, the federal

5. See Appendix A.
6. Infra note 18.
7. See infra text at Appendix A.
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government tried to limit the rate of growth of its contributions to the
provinces. These transfer payments, however, were significant for provincial budgets. Each decision from Ottawa about new adjustments to
transfer payments exacerbated provincial insecurities. Provincial fears
were based on the realization that if the federal government were free to
alter conditional and unconditional grant programmes unilaterally, then
it could just as easily curtail or even terminate such programmes. A
constitutional guarantee was thus sought, one which would at least bind
the federal government to the provision of equalization, payments. In the
end, the federal government committed itself to the "principle" of making
equalization payments, a weaker commitment than that found in subsection (1). Still, subsection (2) was won by the provinces in the hope that
it would ensure continued federal equalization payments.
Part II of this paper focuses on a more legal analysis of s. 36 itself,
based on the history of its formation. Whether or not this section is
justiciable will be the starting point of this examination. Peter Hogg
suggests that the commitment in subsection (2) is too vague to be
justiciable.8 The commitment in subsection (2) is to the "principle" of
making equalization payments to the provinces. The undertaking in
paragraph 36(1)(c), on the other hand, is to "providing" essential public
services. As such the commitment found in subsection (1)(c) is more
direct, and thus, more imperative. Sufficient jurisprudence exists to
suggest that if the issue put to a court has a constitutional feature or a
sufficient legal component then, in spite of its more open texture or
political dimensions, the court will take cognizance of it. The question of
remedy is also briefly explored. Although a coercive remedy may or may
not be available in an action based on this section, considerable authority
exists to suggest that the courts have the power to make "binding
declarations of right, whether or not any consequential relief is or could
be claimed."9 A statement by the courts that a government is acting in
violation of the Constitution without further judicial requirement that its
actions be rectified remains a viable remedy. The actual strength of the
"commitment" of both orders of government to the concerns listed under
paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) will of course determine the standard against

8. Peter Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw in Canada,3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) at 144.
9. JudicatureAct, R.S.A. 1980, c. J- 1, s. 11; Rules of Court, Alta. Reg. 390/68 (O.C. 2208/
68), r. 410(c), (e); Supreme Court Rules, B.C. Reg. 310/76, as amended r. 5(22); The Queen's
Bench Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. C-280, s. 63, r. 8; Rules of the Supreme Court, scheduled to the
JudicatureAct, C.S. Nfld. 1916, c. 83, 0-24, r. 53; Civil ProcedureRules andRelatedRules,
r. 5.14; Courtsof JusticeAct, S.O. 1984, c. 11, s. 110; Civil ProcedureRules, r. 5.14; Queen's
Bench Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. Q-1, s. 45(17); Federal Court Rules, C.R.C. 1978, c. 663, as
amended by SOR79-57 and SORJ79-58, r. 1723. (infra.).
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which government action will be judged pursuant to ss. 36(1). The view
held by some that this subsection only identifies "objectives" for government action is untenable. As already noted, the commitment under
ss. 36(1)(c) is in fact stronger than that found under ss. 36(2). The French
version of this provision also suggests a very binding commitment.' 0
Lastly, the content of governments' commitment under this section
will be considered. Subsection 36(1), in particular, will be examined to
determine the substantial requirements for governmental action as established by their commitment to promoting equal opportunities, furthering
economic development, and providing essential public services. Canada's
international undertakings to promote conditions of economic and social
progress and development will also be referred to in order to illuminate
the content of government action. To the extent that s. 36 entrusts
Canadians' social and economic rights to Parliament and the provincial
legislatures, international instruments to which Canada is a signatory
should provide a set of standards useful to inform the actual content of the
constitutional commitment.
I. Historicaland ConstitutionalQuestions
1. History of ConditionalGrants
Since World War II, at least 100 conditional grants, or shared cost
programmes," have been established in Canada. 2 This device has been
used by the federal government to subsidize the cost of certain social
programmes (usually on a 50-50 split) within a province. "[J]oint
ventures" of this sort have always been initiated by the federal government, and include such well known programmes as Medicare, the Post
10. 36(1) Sous r6serve des comp6tences lgislatives du Parlement et des legislatures et de
leur droit de les exercer, le Parlement et les gouvernements f6d6ral et provinciaux, s'engagent a:
a) promouvoir l'6galti6 des chances de tous les Canadiens dans la recherche de
leur bien-Etre;
b) favouriser le developpement dconomique pour r6duire l'in6galit6 des chances;
c) foumir A tous les Canadiens, A un niveau de qualit6 acceptable, les services
publics essentiels.
(2) Le Parlement et le gouvemement du Canada prennent I'engagement de principe de
faire des paiements de per6quation propres A donner aux gouvernements provinciaux des
revenus suffisants pour les mettre en mesure d'assurer les services publics Aun niveau de
qualit6 et de fiscalit6 sensiblement comparables.
11. Technically, conditional grants are those fiscal transfers which have conditions, or
program criteria, attached to them in exchange for payment of the grant. Shared-cost programs
are fiscal transfers which are usually tied to provincial expenditures on a 50-50 cost sharing
basis. Because the conditional grants relevant to this paper are also shared-cost, these terms will
be used interchangeably in the text unless otherwise noted.
12. Supra note 8 at 145.
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Secondary Education programme, and the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP).
The underlying motivation for these programmes stemmed from a
realization that certain regions of Canada were unable to provide the level
or quality of services which other more prosperous regions could. As
Canadian nationhood matured, Canadians adopted the view that an
individual should enjoy the same opportunities and benefits no matter
what region that individual lived in. J. H. Lynn writes about this "national
sentiment":
[A] ... major problem confronting federal states ... is to implement
suitable policies to enable all regional governments to provide a nationally
acceptable level of services without having to levy relatively high tax rates.
Although many reasons have been advanced... to justify such policies,
the fundamental justification of all policies designed to ensure a more
uniform level of public services in the various regions of a federal state is
the national sentiment which opposes extreme variations in service levels
within the nation and which endorses the sacrifice that may be necessary
to raise service levels in low income areas. This sentiment inevitably arises
and expresses itself through a national political process.13

The national sentiment which did express itself through the political
process became known as "national standards" in social services, and was
realized through conditional grants.
The CAP' 4 for instance, ensures that persons in need, anywhere in the
country, are given the assistance to meet their basic requirements. 5 This
national standard is ensured by the device of the conditional grant, i.e.:
providing assistance to a person in need is a condition which must be
fulfilled in order for a province to receive federal transfer payments made
under this programme. Thus, in return for a 50 per cent subsidy for the cost
of certain social programmes, the federal government "bought" conditions (or programme criteria) which attached to the provincial programmes.

13. James H. Lynn, "Federal-Provincial Fiscal Relations," in J.P. Meekison, ed., Canadian
Federalism: Myth or Reality (Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1968) at 198. See also: K.C.

Wheare, FederalGovernment, 4th ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) at 10.
14.

Canada Assistance Plan Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-I. In 1965, federal and provincial

governments entered into a series of discussions on reforming the existing cost-sharing
agreements. These negotiations eventually resulted in the CanadaAssistance PlanAct of 1966,
which consolidated and expanded the provisions of the prior specific-purpose cost-shared
programs, and for the first time paid federal cost-sharing toward provincial social service
expenditures.
Under CAP, the federal government paid 50 per cent of provincial and municipal costs
of social services to persons in need or likely to become in need if they do not receive such
services. For a person or family to be "in need," they must have assets less than a maximum
specified ceiling and their needs must be greater than their financial resources. The CAP also
cost-shares work activity projects designed to improve the employability of persons who have
unusual difficulty finding and retaining jobs.
15. Ibid. at s. 6(2)(a).
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Since these conditions were the same for every province choosing to
participate in the programme (and they all did), the conditions became
national in scope, binding the country under one standard.
2. ProvincialObjections
Shared-cost programmes have often been criticized by the provinces, in
spite of the fact that provinces opt into these programmes voluntarily. The
most ardent critics of these programmes have been Quebec, Alberta and
Ontario. One allegation consistently raised is that the federal government
is intruding into areas of provincialjurisdiction when it attaches programme
criteria to programmes which fall within the provincial sphere. This
constitutional argument is one of the bases of provincial criticism of
conditional grants. Practical concerns have also inspired provincial
discontentment. The provinces have criticized the fact that conditional
grants force them to reorder their spending priorities. They argue that by
offering to subsidize half the cost of a given programme, the federal
government compels them to implement a programme which they might
not otherwise have introduced, or which they might have introduced in a
different form.' 6 As a result of the substantial expenditures involved for
the provinces, and, despite the one-half subsidy, a significant portion of
their budgets becomes earmarked, in effect, not by the provinces which
raise the money, but by the federal government. 7
A second but related criticism raised by the provinces has been that,
despite the voluntary nature of shared-cost agreements, if a province were
to exercise its prerogative not to participate in a programme, its residents
would nonetheless be required to pay the federal taxes which finance the
federal share of that programme. As a result, residents of the province in
question would be taxed without benefit to them. 8 Provincial criticisms
of shared-cost programmes in large measure stemmed from these and
other practical concerns. The provinces argued that these programmes
constituted a hijacking of their fiscal and social policy priorities, that
"taxation without benefit" was the consequence a provincial government
would inflict on its residents if it were to refuse to participate in a

16. Economic Council of Canada, FinancingConfederation:Today and Tomorrow (Ottawa:
Supply and Services Canada, 1982) at 54.
17. As of 1992, more than one third of provincial budgets were locked into shared-cost
programmes. See supra note 8 at 146.
18. Government of Canada Working Paper on the Constitution, Federal-ProvincialGrants
and the Spending Power of Parliament,by P.E. Trudeau, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969),
Catalogue no. Z2-1969/2-2. Also in A.F. Bayefsky, ed., Canada's ConstitutionAct 1982 &
Amendments (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1989) at 146.
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programme, and that, for Quebec, these programmes were a device of
unwarranted centralization. 9 Along with these criticisms, which rang
louder in some provinces than in others, was the charge that the federal
government was encroaching on provincial jurisdictions through the use
of conditional grants. 20 This constitutional argument, based on the division of powers, warrants special attention.
3. Division of Powers
The areas of health, welfare and education have generally been regarded
as domains of provincial jurisdiction pursuant to the ConstitutionAct,
1867. Through the exercise of its spending power, 2' the federal government has initiated and established shared-cost programmes which brings
the federal authority generally into the fields of health, welfare and
education. Accordingly, this constitutional problem of the federal government acting in provincial jurisdictions must be regarded as a parallel
concern with the practical difficulties experienced by the provinces
which participate in shared-cost programmes.
a. ProvincialJurisdictions
Section 92 of the ConstitutionAct 1867, defines the areas in which the
provinces have exclusive power to make laws. The provinces have
jurisdiction over matters of a "private Nature in the Province," including
all municipal institutions, pursuant to s. 92(16). Provinces are also given

19. Criticisms raised by Quebec, for example, reflect that province's particular distrust of
Ottawa and often advance the position that shared-cost programmes are an instrument of
unwarranted centralization. In 1952, for instance, the federal government introduced a
program for postsecondary education. In order to avoid allegations that it was interfering in an
area of provincial jurisdiction, the federal government sought to channel funds to the provinces
via the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada. Quebec was adamant, however,
that its jurisdictional domain over education in the province would not be tampered with by
Ottawa. The province threatened to reduce its transfer payments if federal assistance were
accepted, and a stand-off ensued until 1959, when the federal government agreed to make tax
room available to Quebec (rather than making the usual grant payments). Quebec in turn agreed
to provide grants to postsecondary education in the province equal to the grants made under
the federal initiative.
20. Quebec's Tremblay Commission, for instance, argued that Parliament had no power to
make grants of any kind, including unconditional grants, in areas of exclusive provincial
jurisdiction, Report of the Royal Commission of Enquiry on Constitutional Problems, vol.2
(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1956) at 217-23.
21. The term "spending power" refers to "the power of Parliament to make payments to
people or institutions or governments for purposes on which it (Parliament) does not
necessarily have the power to legislate". Supra note 18 at 146.
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sole responsibility for the establishment, maintenance, and management
of hospitals, per s. 92(7), and for "Property and Civil Rights in the
Province,"per s. 92(13).22 It is generally agreed that these provisions give
the provinces sole legislative responsibility for welfare support and
services in the most general sense, and for health care and insurance as
well. In addition, s. 93 gives the provinces the exclusive right to legislate
in the area of education. 23 Accordingly, jurisdiction over health, welfare
and education is presumed to be delegated to the provinces, at least more
clearly than is Parliament's or the government of Canada's responsibility
for these areas.

22. 92. In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Law in relation to Matters
coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say,
(7) The Establishment, Maintenance, and Management of Hospitals, Asylums, Charities, and Eleemosynary Institutions in and forthe Province, other than Marine Hospitals.
(13) Property and Civil Rights in the Province.
(16) Generally all Matters of a merely local or private Nature in the Province.
23. 93. In and for each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to
Education, subject and according to the following Provisions:
(1) Nothing in any such Law shall prejudicially affect any Right or Privilege with
respect to Denominational Schools which any Class of Persons have by Law in the
Province at the Union:
(2) All the Powers, Privileges, and Duties at the Union by Law conferred and imposed
in Upper Canada on the Separate Schools and School Trustees of the Queen's Roman
Catholic Subjects shall be and the same are hereby extended to the Dissentient Schools
of the Queen's Protestant and Roman Catholic Subjects in Quebec:
(3) Where in any Province a System of Separate of Dissentient Schools exists by Law
at the Union or is thereafter established by the Legislature of the Province, an Appeal
shall lie to the Governor General in Council from any Act or Decision of any Provincial
Authority affecting any Right or Privilege of the Protestant or Roman Catholic Minority
of the Queen's Subjects in relation to Education:
(4) In case any such Provincial Law as from Time to Time seems to the Governor
General in Council requisite for the due Execution of the Provisions of this Section is
not made, or in case any Decision of the Governor General in Council on any Appeal
under this Section is not duly executed by the proper Provincial Authority in that Behalf,
then and in every such Case, and as far only as the Circumstances of each Case require,
the Parliament of Canada may make remedial Laws for the due Execution of the
Provisions of this Section and of any Decision of the Governor General in Council under
this Section.
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b. FederalJurisdictions
As noted earlier, the federal government has had to use its "spending
power" in order to establish shared-cost programmes since no explicit
delegation of authority over the areas of health, welfare and education is
conferred upon the federal government under the Constitution Act,
1867.24 Before examining the constitutional authority for the federal
spending power, however, it will be useful to highlight the constitutional
difference between federal contributions in the form of unconditional
grants, and contributions to shared-cost programmes or conditional
grants.
Unconditional grants to the provinces (usually to less prosperous ones)
are payments with no strings attached, intended to equalize provincial
revenue. Accordingly, the provinces in receipt of such grants are free to
spend the money for their own purposes. These grants, known as
"equalization payments," are contemplated under s. 36(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982, and are generally accepted as being constitutionally
unproblematic since they do not interfere with the exercise of provincial
authority.
Conditional grants, however, involve payments to the provinces on
condition that the programme in question accord with federal stipulations. In order to "spend" its money in areas of provincial jurisdiction and
to attach conditions to the way this money is spent, the federal government has had to rely on its "spending power" as the source grounding its
authority. The federal position with respect to conditional grants is
precarious because the spending power itself is not explicitly authorized
by the ConstitutionAct, 1867. Rather, it must be inferred from the federal
powers to levy taxes, per s. 91(3), to legislate in relation to "public
property", per s. 91(1A), and to appropriate federal funds, per s. 106.25

24. The only exceptions to this are unemployment insurance and old age security, which were
transferred to federal jurisdiction by constitutional amendment.
25. Supra note 8 at 150. See also A. Petter, "Federalism and the Myth of the Federal Spending
Power" (1989) 68 Can. Bar Rev. at 448.
91. It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate
and House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of
Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act
asigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces; and for greater Certainty, but
not so as to restrict the Generality of the foregoing Terms of this Section, it is hereby
declared that (notwithstanding anything in this Act) the exclusive Legislative Authority
of the Parliament of Canada extends to all Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects
next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say,
(IA) The Public Debt and Property.
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The question remains, do these powers confer sufficient authority on the
26
federal government to spend in areas which are outside theirjurisdiction?
Canadian courts have in fact upheld the federal spending power
indirectly, most notably in Re CanadaAssistance Plan (199 1),27 while at
the same time holding that the use of the spending power should not
amount to "regulation" in a provincial field. This judgment assessed CAP
in order to determine its intrusiveness into the provincial domain and
concluded that CAP was not "regulatory" and therefore not ultravires the
federal government. This broad interpretation of the federal spending
power, however, is relatively recent. During the period of discussions
leading up to the patriation of the Constitution, no judicial decision had
yet affirmed the use of the federal spending power for purposes within the
provincial domain as clearly as did Re Canada Assistance Plan. As a
result, it is important historically to consider the precarious status of the
federal spending power, especially with respect to conditional grants,
during the period of constitutional renewal, up to 1982.28 During that
time, the debate had pit those who advanced a narrow view of the federal
spending power against the proponents of a broad view. Importantly, both
positions relied implicitly on competing interpretive approaches to the
Constitution.

(3) The raising of Money by any Mode or System of Taxation.
106. Subject to the several Payments by this Act charged on the Consolidated Revenue
Fund of Canada, the same shall be appropriated by the Parliament of Canada for the
Public Service.
26. Some commentators have argued that the general pattern of division of powers in the
Constitution Act, 1867, implicitly restricts the federal taxing power under s. 91(3) to raising
money for federal purposes only, and not for those within the provincial sphere. It is further
argued, politically, that "fiscal responsibility" requires each level of government to finance its
own expenditures through its own taxation (Supra note 8 at 150).
Other scholars conclude that the only limitation on the federal spending power is that it
not be used as a means of "legislating" or "regulating" a program within the provincial domain
(see B. Laskin, CanadianConstitutionalLaw (Toronto: Carswell, 1966) at 666; and G.V. La
Forest, The Allocation of Taxing Power under the Canadian Constitution (Toronto: The
Canadian Tax Foundation, 1967) at 36-41).
Others, still, hold the view that the spending power is part of the uncodified framework
of government. The Crown has the right to make gifts, and attach conditions to them, while the
provinces are at liberty to accept the offer or refuse it, the only stipulation being that Parliament
approve the offer. F.R. Scott writes: "These simple but significant powers ... derive from
doctrines of the Royal Prerogative and the common law," (see F.R. Scott, "The Constitutional
Background of Taxation Agreements" 1955 McGill L.J. 2 at 6. See also supra note 8 at 152).
27. Re CanadaAssistance Plan, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525 at 567.
28. I argue later in this paper that entrenching the federal spending power, and especially with
respect to conditional grants, was one of the major underlying imperatives which led to the
creation and inclusion of s. 36(1) in the ConstitutionAct, 1982.

Providing Essential Services

c.

Interpretationsof the Division of Powers

The narrow interpretation of federal spending power was founded on the
conviction that the constitutional division of powers was absolute, and
that the respective federal and provincial jurisdictions, as they had been
originally assigned in the ConstitutionAct, 1867, were akin to "watertight
compartments". 2 9 Thus, the respective levels of government were strictly
barred from each other's jurisdictional fields. The broad interpretation
was based on the belief that the framers of the Constitution could not have
foreseen the unavoidability, indeed the necessity, of overlapping authority in the "modem world".3" Those who held this view insisted that the
division of powers, as it is found in the ConstitutionAct, 1867, should be
interpreted more flexibly, and thus more broadly. 31
The broad interpretation of the division of powers has most recently
been affirmed in part because it considers more than the strict textual
construction of the Constitution. By taking into account the reality of the
modem world as being different from that of 1867, those who would
advance a broad interpretation gain for their argument the force of reason.
Donald Smiley writes:
The old classical federalism in which each level carried out the functions
assigned to it by the constitution in relative isolation from the other had
some relevance to a period when governmental responsibilities
were
2
limited in scope and importance. It has no relevance today.

Other scholars, of course, would agree. Speaking before the Special
Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on the
Constitution of Canada, in 1978, Gerard V. La Forest responded to a
challenge on the division of powers in the following manner:
Senator Denis: But if there is a distribution of power, a clear-cut distribution of power, the federal [sic] will have the right to do those kinds of things

then and the provincial legislation the same. If the powers are divided
adequately there will be no need of a new chambre haute.
Mr. La Forest: The simple fact is, you know, that in 1867 a great attempt

was made at dividing powers so that they did not overlap. They do overlap.
I am sure that if we tried in this year they would overlap next year. In fact,

29. This metaphor was first coined by Lord Atkin: A.G. Canada v,A.G. Ontario, [1937]

A.C.326 at 354.
30. Supra note 8 at 151.
31. For a thorough analysis of the division of powers in a federal state, see: D.V. Smiley,
"Federalism and the Public Policy Process" in J.P. Meekison, ed., CanadianFederalism:Myth
or Reality, 3d ed. (Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1977) at 366.
32. Ibid. at 369.

320 The Dalhousie Law Journal

the world is not so simple that you can divide it on highly abstract
principles. There will be overlap, there is overlap, and it will continue.33
In spite of the reasoned arguments of scholars about the necessity of
taking a broad view of the division of powers, however, the issue
remained contentious with respect to the federal spending power. Having
its authority constructed as it was on more than one provision of the
Constitution, no federal government could say with certainty that it had
the right to initiate conditional grant programmes. Consequently, one of
the dominant underlying concerns for the federal government during the
constitutional renewal process was to anchor securely its own spending
power by making it more explicit in a new constitution.
4. ConstitutionalRenewal
The effort to patriate the Constitution was initiated at the FederalProvincial First Ministers' Conference, held in Ottawa on February 5, 6
and 7th, 1968. 34 At that time, the federal and provincial leaders agreed to
begin a review of the Constitution without limiting the general scope of
the review.35 This process lasted until 1982, when the ConstitutionAct,
1982 was at last realized for Canadians.
The first steps taken by then Prime Minister Trudeau was to outline, for
discussion purposes, the broad objectives of confederation as a basis
which could give rise to a more substantial document. The four objectives
identified by the Government of Canada were presented to both the heads
of the provincial governments and to the people of Canada in a 1968
36
federal publication entitled, The Constitutionandthe People ofCanada,

33. Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons, Minutes of
Proceedingsand Evidence on the Constitution of Canada(6 September 1978) at 10:61.

34. At the conclusion of this conference, it was decided that a continuing Constitutional
Conference be set up, composed of the Prime Minister and Premiers or their delegates, to
supervise the process of constitutional review; that a Continuing Committee of officials be set
up to assist the Constitutional Conference; that a secretariat be formed by the federal
government, after consultation with the provinces, to serve both the Constitutional Conference
and the Continuing Committee of officials; that the Continuing Committee of officials be
allowed to set up sub-committees on specific questions; with the approbation of the Prime
Minister, "Federal-Provincial First Ministers' Conference, Feb. 5-7, 1968" Document no.
13-CD-004-E (Ottawa: 5-7 February 1968). Bayefsky, supra note 18 at 74.
35. P.E. Trudeau, "Government of Canada Working Paper on the Constitution" in The
Constitution and the People of Canada:An Approach to the Objectives of Confederation,the
Rights of People andthe Institutionsof Government (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969), Cat. No.

CP 32-9-1969. Bayefsky, supra note 18 at 78.
36. Ibid.
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and authored by the Prime Minister himself. These objectives were to be
included in the preamble of the Constitution. The third of these objectives
made broad reference to concerns listed under what has now become
s. 36(1) of the present Constitution:
To promote nationaleconomic, social and culturaldevelopment, and the
generalwelfare and equality ofopportunityfor all Canadiansin whatever
region they may live, including the opportunityfor gainful work,for just
conditionsof employment,for an adequate standardof living,for security,
for education, andfor rest and leisure.37

Although intentionally broad, Prime Minister Trudeau explained that the
goal of individual fulfillment for all Canadians is meant to be realized in
two ways. Firstly, "[t]his goal, if it is to have any meaning, must embrace
all aspects of individual development-economic, social and culturaland it must apply to all Canadians... In our view, however, economic,
social and cultural development should be thought of primarily as the
creation of opportunity for individual Canadians-the opportunity to
realize their full potential."38 Secondly, "equal opportunity for all Canadians," as contributing to Canadians' individual fulfillment.., should be
thought of in terms of the equalization of opportunity as among the
regions of Canada. There is no room in our society for great or widening
disparities as between the opportunities available to individual Canadians,
or disparities in the opportunities or the public services available in the
several regions of Canada.39 Thus, from the start of the constitutional
renewal process, "equal opportunity for all Canadians" was intended to
include the opportunity for gainful work, for just conditions of employment, for an adequate standard of living, for security, for education, and
for rest and leisure. In short, this phrase, which later appears as ss. 36(1)(a),
was intended to bear substantive content. 4° In addition, "equal opportunity for all Canadians" was said to include the availability of public
services for individual Canadians irrespective of the region in which they
live.

37.

Ibid.

38. Ibid. [emphasis in original].
39.

Ibid.

40. The content of this phrase, as outlined by the federal government, is an elucidation of the
phrase "national economic, social and cultural development", used earlier in this passage. This
federal initiative reflects its international undertakings as a signatory to the International
Convention on Economic, Social, and CulturalRights, infra note 128. For a discussion of this

international document and Canada's obligations as a signatory to it, please see the "International Documents as Interpretive Guides" section of this paper.
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In order to realize this goal, in general terms, the Government of
Canada must be given sufficient constitutional powers to:
... redistribute income and to maintain reasonable levels of livelihood for
individual Canadians, if the effects of regional disparities on individual
citizens are to be minimized."
Securing sufficient constitutional powers for the government of Canada
was therefore considered necessary for the realization of the above
"national" objective. Yet, some of the concerns identified in this objective, such as "an adequate standard of living" and "education" for
example, had been already delegated to the provinces under the Constitution Act, 1867. In other words, the federal government clearly believed
that its existing constitutional authority to act in these provincial fields
was not sufficiently secure. The federal government's resolve to shore up
its role in these specific areas of provincial domain continued as an
ongoing theme in the constitutional negotiations until 1982.
In "A Briefing Paper on Discussions within the Continuing Committee
of Officials", dated December 12, 1968 and forwarded to each of the
government delegations, six main points were brought forward from
discussions on Regional Disparities. The second of these points expressed the view that:
... there should be some specific constitutional provision respecting a
federal role andresponsibilityin the reductionofregionaldisparities.One

suggestion was that the federal government must have the fiscal and
economic powers to enable it to contribute through redistribution of
income measures to the welfare of individuals, as well as to implement
economic
development programmes for the benefit of a region as a
42
whole.

Although it is not certain which delegation made this suggestion, it was
clearly of sufficient significance in the discussions of the Continuing
Committee for it to be included in their summary report. What makes this
suggestion significant is that it identifies the kind of role envisaged for the
federal government to play in meeting its responsibility to reduce
regional disparities. That role is stated as being the exercise of federal
fiscal and economic powers. Given that the federal government would be
contributing fiscally towards fields in the provincial domain, this suggestion clearly contemplates the exercise of the federal spending power,
thereby endorsing it.

41. Ibid.
42. "A Briefing Paper on Discussions within the Continuing Committee of Officials" (12
December 1968) in Bayefsky, supra note 18 at 122 [emphasis added].
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The Government of Canada publicly suggested that such a provision
be considered in addition to the objective already slated for the preamble
of the Constitution in 1969. In a Government of Canada Working Paper
on the Constitution, The Taxing Powers and the Constitutionof Canada,
the Honourable E.J. Benson, Minister of Finance, writes:
... the Government of Canada would propose two specific constitutional
provisions....
First,the Preambleto the Constitution--thestatement of objectivesshould state as a goalforall governments the provisionof equal opportunityfor allCanadians,includingthe availabilityto them of essentialpublic
services....

Secondly, the Constitution should provide the Parliamentof Canada
with explicit power to contribute toward the equalization of necessary
provincialpublic services across Canada. . .. 3 [emphasis in original]

Here, for the first time, the federal government openly acknowledged its
intention to secure constitutional power to contribute to a jurisdiction
which is explicitly cited as belonging to the provinces: "provincial public
services". Again, the explicit power of Parliament to contribute toward
the equalization of provincial public services clearly anticipated the
exercise of the federal spending power.
As stated earlier, unconditional grants were hardly constitutionally
problematic for the federal government because under the equalization
payment programme, the federal government was simply giving money
to the provinces without directing them on how that money should be
spent. Accordingly, the federal government under this programme took
very little risk of running afoul of the division of powers. Unlike
unconditional grants, however, conditional grants posed a far greater
constitutional problem for the federal government in this regard. Conditional grants permitted the federal government not only to determine
which provincialpublic services are funded, but also to set conditions on
the way these programmes are structured; conditional grants left the
federal government particularly vulnerable to allegations of "regulating"
in the provincial sphere. Indeed, provincial governments and federal
critics alike had severely criticized the federal government on this issue.
From a division of powers standpoint, then, the federal government faced
far greater pressure to resolve the Constitutional issue surrounding its use
of conditional grants than it did for its use of unconditional grants.
Accordingly, the provision which the federal government was seeking to
include in the Constitution was primarily intended to provide Parliament

43. E.J. Benson, "Government of Canada Working Paper on the Constitution" The Taxing
Powers andthe Constitutionof Canada(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969) Cat. No. Z2-1969/2-1.
Bayefsky, supra note 18 at 140.
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with explicit power to make conditional grants, rather than equalization
payments.
a. ConditionalGrants & the Spending Power
The federal government made its intentions clear in another Working
Paper on The Constitution, Federal-ProvincialGrantsandthe Spending
Power of Parliament,again authored by the Prime Minister in 1969."
After defining the term "spending power" as meaning "the power of
Parliament to make payments to people or institutions or governments for
purposes on which it (Parliament) does not necessarily have the power to
legislate,"45 the Prime Minister proceeded to elaborate on the use of the
spending power and its benefits for individual Canadians by discussing
the CAP, which has the federal government contributing one half of the
provincialcost of social assistance to individuals in need. The equalization of provincial public services, which is said to include health, welfare,
education and roads, was also identified as a benefit arising from the
existence of the spending power:
The importance of the spending power in Canada can be illustrated by
looking at some of the programmes which are founded primarily upon it
(as opposed to being based upon Parliament's regulatory powers).... In
particular, family allowances are paid to all mothers in Canada... and the
federal government pays to the provinces one half of the cost of social
assistance payments to individuals in need (under the Canada Assistance
Plan-costing over $400 million)....
The equalizationofprovincialpublicservices-includinghealth, welfare,

education, and roads-is also accomplished largely because of the existence of the spending power. 46
After defining the federal spending power and illustrating its use by
drawing from existing conditional and unconditional grant programmes,
the Prime Minister acknowledged the fact that the spending power was
a constitutionally contentious issue, and discussed the matter in some
detail.
(i) the division ofpowers

The issue of whether Parliament may spend in the provincial domain
raises questions about how the division of powers should be interpreted

44. Supra note 18 at 146.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid. at 147.
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(as discussed in an earlier section of this paper).47 Prime Minister Trudeau
began by acknowledging that the provinces were delegated specific
authorities under ss. 92 and 93 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867, and that the
federal government was given specific jurisdictions under s. 91 of that
Act. The constitutional authority of the spending power, pursuant to
s. 91(3) and s. 91 (1A), was also surveyed. 48 Finally, the specific and hotly
disputed constitutional ruling by the Privy Council in Reference re
Employment and Social Insurance Act,4 9 was noted, along with the
passage which had raised the most serious objections to the validity of the
spending power itself. If read in sequence, the following two passages are
informative:
That the Dominion may impose taxation for the purpose of creating a fund
for special purposes, and may apply that fund for making contributions in
the public interest to individuals, corporations or public authorities, could
not as a general proposition be denied....
... But assuming that the Dominion has collected by means of taxation a
fund, it by no means follows that any legislation which disposes of it is
necessarily within Dominion competence.
It may still be legislation affecting the classes of subjects enumerated
in s. 92, and, if so, would be ultra vires. In other words, Dominion
legislation, even though it deals with Dominion property, may yet be so
framed as to invade civil rights within the Province, or encroach upon the
classes of subjects which are reserved to Provincial competence.',
The latter passage illustrates the precarious constitutional status of the
spending power, as well as all conditional if not unconditional grant
programmes, at that time.
In defense of the spending power and conditional grants generally,
Prime Minister Trudeau cited two scholars for a favorable interpretation
of this passage: Bora Laskin and Gerard V. La Forest. Both commentators
advanced the view that Parliament may in fact make conditional and
unconditional grants provided only that the programme involved does not
amount to legislation or regulation of a provincial power.5' Still, the
scholarly interpretations cannot supercede the decisions of the Court or
of the Privy Council, and Quebec' s Tremblay Commission, thirteen years
earlier, had relied on this very passage to argue that both conditional as
well as unconditional grants to the provinces were unconstitutional."

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Supra part 1.3.
Supra notes 22, 23, & 25.
Re Employment and Social InsuranceAct, [1937] A.C. 355.
Ibid. at 366. Bayefsky, supra note 18 at 148.
Supra note 21. Bayefsky, supra note 18 at 149.
Supra note 20.
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In spite of the contention, however, Prime Minister Trudeau asserted
the federal position by simply stating:
Federal governments consistently have taken the position that Parliament's
power to spend is clear ....

1

The claim that Parliament's power to spend is clear under the Constitution
Act, 1867 obviously side-steps the debate about the federal spending
power. Even if the spending power were clearly authorized by the
existing Constitution, that power must at least be found to reflect the
limitations on it as advanced by even the most favorable interpretation on
which the government could rely, that of Laskin and La Forest: that
Parliament could make conditional and unconditional grants to the
provinces provided only that the programme involved did not amount to
legislation or regulation of a provincial power.
Despite the federal claim that Parliament's power to spend was clear,
it nonetheless was certainly not clear enough, either to detractors or to the
courts, as the decision of the Privy Council illustrated. Yet, the federal
government had already committed itself to a great number of conditional
and unconditional grant programmes which had been implemented and
continued to exist because of the spending power. If the federal government was going to ensure the continued survival of these programmes, it
would necessarily have to maintain that the spending power was constitutionally valid.
Accordingly, the issue from the federal government's perspective
could not be framed in a manner that would question the legitimacy of the
spending power, i.e. whether or not the division of powers permitted the
spending power. Rather, the issue would have to be formulated in a way
that would both affirm the spending power while at the same time take
into account the debate surrounding it. The "problem", then, for the
federal government, was not (and could not be) that the division of powers
did not affirm the spending power, but rather that the division of powers
did not explicitly affirm it. In other words, if the Constitution did
explicitly recognize the spending power (instead of forcing advocates of
the spending power to construct it on the basis of more than one section
of the Constitution) then debate and uncertainty over the spending power
would end.
Thus, the federal intention at this stage of the constitutional renewal
process could not be characterized as an attempt by the federal government to gain powers which it did not have. A more accurate conclusion
had to be that the federal government feared that its use of the spending

53.

Supra note 18 at 149.

Providing Essential Services

power, particularly with respect to conditional grants, was not "explicit"
enough and therefore not as "clear" as Prime Minister Trudeau would
suggest. As a result, the federal government sought to make its spending
power more definitive in a renewed constitution.
A further point ensued from the federal government's refusal to retreat
from the controversy surrounding the division of powers. Since it
publicly took the position that the existing division of powers under the
Constitution Act, 1867 was clear and needed no redrafting in order to
authorize the spending power, any specific provision in a new constitution explicitly affirming the federal spending power would, from the
federal standpoint, neither add to nor otherwise alter the existing division
of powers. Such a provision would merely have the effect of clarifying
what, up until that point, had been simply implicit.
(ii) federal constitutionalproposal

Prime Minister Trudeau's statement regarding the federal government's
consistently held position on the spending power came as no surprise. Nor
was it surprising that this federal government, with a review of the
constitution under way, would want to make Parliament's power to spend
clearer, or more explicit, in a new constitution. This was, in fact, the first
of three proposals advanced by the Government of Canada in the FederalProvincialGrantsandthe Spending PowerofParliamentWorking Paper

submitted to the Constitutional Conference:
... the Government of Canada has attempted to develop certain principles
which it could tentatively advance to the Constitutional Conference as a
basis for reviewing this aspect of the Constitution. They are these:
(1) The constitutionalpower of the Parliamentof Canadato contribgovernments
ute towardthe public services andprogrammesofprovincial
54
should be providedfor explicitly in the constitution;

With this proposal, then, the federal government sought to entrench the
existing practice of financially contributing towards provincial public
services.
Of particular importance, too, in this proposal, was the fact that, in
addition to the use of the broad term "public services", the term
"programmes of provincial governments" was employed to identify the
objects of the federal spending power. In other words, what the federal
government was seeking explicit constitutional power to do was not only
to contribute financially to provincial public services in a general way,
but more significantly, to do so with respect to specific provincial

54.

Ibid. at 154.
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programmes. Contributions to specific programmes, or funds which
would be earmarked explicitly for specific programmes such as health,
education and welfare, entailed the use of conditional rather than unconditional grants, because only conditional grants permitted federal moneys
to be targeted to a specific provincial programme.
The federal government's second principle spoke to the separate
matter of unconditional grants:
(2) The power ofParliamentto make unconditionalgrants to provincial governments for the purpose of supporting their programmes and
public services should be unrestricted."

The federal government clearly felt confident that unrestricted authority
to provide unconditional grants would meet with little resistance from the
provinces. Indeed, as unconditional grants, these payments would not
bind the provinces' use of the money in any way. By not arguing that the
power to make conditional grants be similarly unrestricted, the federal
government implicitly accepted the existence of limitations on the use of
conditional grants (presumably, from the government's Working Paper,
that conditional grants could not amount to legislation or regulation in the
provincial fields).
The federal government also advanced, in its third principle, other
limitations on its power to make conditional grants:
(3) The power of Parliamentto make general conditionalgrants in
respect offederal-provincialprogrammes which are acknowledged to be
within exclusive provincialjurisdictionshould be basedupon two requirements: first, a broad national consensus in favour of any proposed
programme should be demonstratedto exist before Parliamentexercises
its power; andsecondly the decision of a provinciallegislatureto exercise
its constitutionalright not to participatein any programme, even given a
in a fiscal penalty being imposed
national consensus, should not result
6
upon the people-of that province.1

This principle expressly addressed the practical concerns and criticisms
of the provinces. Aside from the constitutional issue of the division of
powers, the provinces had complained about the federal government's
unilateral selection of the provincial public services which warranted
standardization through the use of conditional grants. With this proposal,
the federal government appeared to be reassuring the provinces that
before the initiation of a conditional grant programme, a broad national
consensus in favour of any proposed programme would first be established.

55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
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The second part of this proposal addressed another provincial complaint about the existing structure of conditional grants. As noted earlier,
provinces which did not participate in a conditional grant programme
exposed their residents to the same taxation which would be levied if the
programme were in place while denying them the benefit of the programme.
Such taxation without benefit, or fiscal penalty for a province choosing
not to participate in a conditional grant programme, was expressly
recognized and rejected by the federal government in this proposal. This
federal proposal made guarantees to the provinces about the structure of
future conditional grants. What the federal government sought in return
was acceptance of its first principle and affirmation of its spending power.
Ultimately, however, this formula for future conditional grants was not
accepted by the Constitutional Conference.
(iii) rationalefor the spending power
As noted above, the underlying reason for the federal desire to see its
spending power explicitly expressed in the Constitution was the concern
that as long as the spending power, as it was then constructed, continued
to trigger objection and dispute, it, along with its concomitant programmes,
would continue to survive on an uncertain constitutional basis. The
federal government went to some length to stress the importance of the
spending power, and listed specific reasons why the spending power
should be explicitly accounted for in a new constitution.
Prime Minister Trudeau advanced four reasons why the spending
power was required: the interdependence of the modem state, the interdependence of government policies, the sense of community in a united
country, and the role of the Parliament of Canada. The first two arguments, the interdependence of the modern state, and the interdependence
of its government policies, were described in terms which clearly distinguished the modem state from the society which produced the original
division of powers in 1867. As a result of modern economics and
technology, as well as greatly increased mobility of the population, Prime
Minister Trudeau argued that it would be impossible to expect that only
the people within a particular jurisdiction should be affected by government policies for that jurisdiction:57

57.

Ibid. at 151.
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There are benefits which flow to the people of the whole of Canada from
certain of the services of provincial governments, when such services take
into account national as well as provincial interests, and there are costs
which are borne by the people of the whole of Canada when the programmes
of a particular province fail to take into account the extra-provincial
effects."
According to his argumentation, this interdependence of the modem
state becomes problematic if provincial interests conflict with national
interests. Such conflict is expected to arise by the very nature of the
"provincial" versus "national" strata of a federation. The terms of
reference, for instance, by which provincial governments are guided are
said to be different from those which guide the national, or federal
government. The priorities imposed upon provincial governments by
their constituencies are often different from priorities demanded of the
national government by its constituencies. Thirdly, the objectives of
provincial policies will be directed more to the needs and wishes of the
provincial constituency than to those of the national constituency. Lastly,
the consequences of provincial policies will be gauged by politicians with
regards to their provincial constituency, and not the national interest.5 9
In order to ensure that provincial policies do not harm national interests
in a modem state, then Prime Minister Trudeau argued that there must
exist a "mechanism" by which the national government may co-ordinate
provincial actions which may impact on national interests. He identified
the spending power and specifically shared-cost initiatives as being that
mechanism.
The sense of community in a united country is the third essential reason
for a federal spending power. This sense of community, in Prime Minister
Trudeau's terms, signifies a sense of responsibility amongst Canadians
for their compatriots in other parts of the country, and finds expression in
the belief that an individual living in one part of Canada will be able to
receive the same or similar standards of public services as an individual
living in another part of the country.6° Such a "vehicle", or mechanism by
which this can be achieved, is the spending power, and in particular
conditional grant programmes, Mr. Trudeau argued.

58. [bid.
59. Ibid. at 151-53.
60. "[O]ne of the most important ways of giving expression to this concern is by the provision
to every citizen, wherever he lives, of adequate levels of public services-in particular of
health, welfare and education services. Again, some vehicle is required by which Canadians
can achieve this goal-by which the "national interest" in the level of general provincial public
services or of a particular public service can be expressed." Ibid. at 153.
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Lastly, the role of the Parliament of Canada was advanced as another
reason why the spending power was required. Since Parliament is the
only body which is elected by all the citizens of a country, it is uniquely
able to represent the "national interest" of its citizens. Furthermore,
citizens of a federation look to Parliament to assert and protect the
national interest.6' The importance of the role of Parliament in a federation is the reason why Parliament should be playing a role in the
provincial domain in the provision of provincial health, welfare and
education services, because that role is a necessary one from a national
interest point of view, and Parliament is the only appropriate body to meet
that responsibility. Prime Minister Trudeau concluded:
because the people of Canada will properly look to a popularly elected
Parliament to represent their national interests, it should play a role, with
the provinces, in achieving the best results for Canada from provincial
policies and programmes whose effects extend beyond the boundaries of
a province.62

Thus, because of the interdependence of the modem state and its
government policies, the sense of community in a united country, and the
role of Parliament in a federation, Prime Minister Trudeau argued that
Parliament had a valid role to play in the provision of provincial public
services. Moreover, this role was one which Parliament must be able to
play because a significant national interest exists in the way provincial
public services are provided. It is through the mechanism, or vehicle, of
conditional grants that Parliament fulfills this responsibility. Accordingly, Prime Minister Trudeau and the federal government were determined to see the spending power explicitly affirmed in the new
Constitution.
b. Realization of FederalProposal(1969-71)
Consensus on the inclusion in the Constitution of a substantive provision
affirming the federal spending power was arrived at incrementally
between 1969 and the emergence of the Victoria Charter in 1971. At the
Federal-Provincial First Ministers' Conference, Ottawa, December 8-10,

61. "[Tlhe nationally elected Parliament has a unique and legitimate role to play in
determining the national interest, even where provincial jurisdiction is involved. And it is to
suggest, further, that Parliament is the appropriate body to make grants to the provinces for the
purpose of equalizing provincial public services and for the purpose of compensating the
provinces for adapting their programmes to meet national as well as provincial needs." Ibid.
at 154.
62. Ibid. [emphasis in original].
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1969, the Conference made the following conclusions with respect to
Regional Disparities:
The Conference reiterated the earlier agreement that the objective of
reducing disparities across the country should be written into the preamble
of a revised Constitution as a basic goal of the Canadian people.
It was recognized that both levels of government had responsibility for the
achievement of this goal and that each should have appropriate powers for
this purpose. Eightprovinces and thefederal government agreed that the
federalgovernment should have thepower to alleviateregionaldisparities
in relation to the income of individuals, inequality of economic development and standardsof public services....

There was some support for the inclusion of a substantive provision in the
body of the Constitution which would set forth the obligation, not subject
to judicial review, of the federal and provincial governments related to
regional disparities.63 [emphasis added]
Thus, the federal government was already beginning to realize its
intention to secure a role for itself in the standards of provincial public
services delivery through the use of its spending power. The fact that the
federal government should have the power to alleviate inequitable
standards of public services, a direct reference to the federal use of
conditional grants to establish national standards of public services,
reflected the Conference's expectation that the federal government's role
would be fulfilled through the exercise of its spending power.
The substantive provision identified by the Conference as receiving
"some support" would entail a statement of the federal and provincial
governments' obligation with respect to the alleviation of regional
disparities, inequalities of economic development and standards of
public services. Naturally, these obligations were expected to be different
for the federal and provincial governments. The phrase used in the
Conference's conclusions was that "each should have appropriate powers for this purpose" (i.e., the reduction of disparities across the country).
The obligation of the federal government in this respect would entail the
exercise of its spending power in the fields of provincial public services
to ensure that national interests therein would be asserted and protected.
The obligation of the provincial governments would arise out of their own
constitutional power and responsibility for delivering the public services.
As noted by the Conference, the obligations of the federal and provincial
governments to alleviate disparities was not meant to be subject to
judicial review.

63. "Federal-Provincial First Ministers' Conference, Ottawa" (8-10 December 1969) Document no. 13-CD-05 I-E. Bayefsky, supra note 18 at 200.
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At the second working session of the Constitutional Conference,
Ottawa, September 14-15, 1970, the Conference concluded on Regional
Disparities:
26. The Constitutional Conference unanimously agreed that it is one of
the foremost purposes of the country to ensure that disparities in the wellbeing and in the economic, social and cultural opportunity of individuals
in all regions throughout Canada should be alleviated.
27. To this end, the First Ministers reaffirmed their agreement that the
objective of reducing such disparities across the country should be written
into the preamble of a revised Constitution as a basic goal of the Canadian
people.
28. The Conferenceagreed,further,BritishColumbiadissenting, that the
Constitutionshould contain, in addition,a statementof the moral obligation of both the federal and provincialgovernments to take appropriate
actionfor the purpose of realizing this objective... .' [emphasis added]
Thus, by as early as 1970, inclusion of a substantive provision which
explicitly recognized a role for the federal government to play in
provincial fields which were affected by regional disparities received
almost unanimous agreement. That role was the practice of using the
spending power to contribute to provincial public services. Five months
later, the federal government gained the support it needed for constitutional recognition of the spending power. The third Working Session of
the Constitutional Conference, Ottawa, February 8-9, 1971, provided the
rough outline of a substantive provision which the federal government
had been seeking. The Conference's statement of conclusions on Regional Disparities stated:
(a) The preamble should state that one objective of Confederation is the
social, economic, and cultural development, and the general welfare and
equality of opportunity for all citizens in whatever region they may live;
(b) In the body of the Constitution there should be a statement of
obligation of all governments, federal and provincial
i -to promote equality of opportunity and well-being for all individuals;
ii - to ensure, as nearly as possible, that essential public services of
reasonable quality will be available to individual citizens.
iii -to promote economic development which will reduce disparities in
the social and economic opportunities of individual Canadians in whatever
region they may live.
This obligation would not be enforceable by the Courts and would not have
65
the effect of altering the distribution of legislative powers.
64. "Constitutional Conference, Ottawa" (14-15 September 1970) Document no.
13-CD-070-E (Ottawa, Sept. 15, 1970). Bayefsky, supra note 18 at 205.
65. "Constitutional Conference, Ottawa" (8-9 February 1971) Doc. 13-CD-082-E. Bayefsky,
supra note 18 at 210.
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For the federal government to have an "obligation" with respect to
jurisdictions acknowledged as being part of the provincial domain
suggested that the federal government had the power to meet its obligation. The federal spending power constituted that power which would
enable the federal government to meet its obligation in the provision of
provincial public services, especially the setting of national standards in
relation to public services (par. ii).
Accordingly, the federal government won clearer affirmation of the
spending power than had as yet existed. Although it fell short of a
provision which boldly states that "the federal spending power is affirmed", yet, by recognizing that the federal government had a role to play
in the provision of provincial public services, the preliminary draft
advanced by the Conference implicitly acknowledged the federal spending power. Such acknowledgment was the kind of recognition for the
"power of the Parliament of Canada to contribute toward the public
services and programmes of provincial governments"6 6 which Prime
Minister Trudeau and the federal government had been seeking from the
outset.
The last sentence of this preliminary draft provision asserted that this
obligation would not have the effect of altering the division of powers. As
suggested earlier, the federal government did not believe that an actual
redistribution of legislative powers was required for it to secure the
spending power. Indeed, the federal government felt that it already had
that power under the existing Constitution. What, however, was wanting
was "explicit recognition" in the Constitution of the status-quo in federal/
provincial fiscal relations. Thus, with a provision such as the one
advanced by the Conference, the federal government could agree that the
division of powers need not be altered, while at the same time attaining
the much sought after recognition of the spending power-which was
lacking up until this time. The substantive provision on regional disparities, which until then had been only contemplated, appeared in the body
of the Victoria Charter issued after the Federal-Provincial First Ministers' Conference in Victoria, June 14-16, 1971:

66. The first principle advanced by the federal government to the Constitutional Conference
in Trudeau, supra note 18 at 154.
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Part VII
Regional Disparities
Art. 46. The Parliament and Government of Canada and the Legislatures
and Governments of the Provinces are committed to:
(1) the promotion of equality of opportunity and well being for all
individuals in Canada;
(2) the assurance, as nearly as possible, that essential public services
of reasonable quality are available to all individuals in Canada; and
(3) the promotion of economic development to reduce disparities in
the social and economic opportunities for all individuals in Canada
wherever they may live.
Art. 47. The provisions of this Part shall not have the effect of altering the
distribution of powers and shall not compel the Parliament of Canada or
Legislatures of the Provinces to exercise their legislative powers.67
According to the foregoing text, both orders of government made a
commitment to equality of opportunity, national standards of essential
public services, and equality of economic opportunities.
The role which the federal government was anticipated to play in
meeting its commitment under this provision was the use of its spending
power. This was particularly apparent in light of the federal commitment
assuring that essential public services of reasonable quality would be
available to all individualsin Canada,para. (2), a commitment met by the
federal use of its spending power to initiate and maintain conditional
grant programmes with respect to public services. Only by this device
could a crazy-quilt of provincial programmes give way to national
standards. As a result, the federal government succeeded in gaining
substantial recognition of its spending power-indeed, the conditional
use of the spending power.
c. History of s. 36 (1972-1982)
Articles 46 and 47 of the Victoria Charter were redrafted five times (1975,
1978, 1979, 1980 and 1981) before their final version appeared as s. 36
of the ConstitutionAct, 1982. In substance, the provision remained the
same from 1971 to 1982, with two significant exceptions: the addition, in
1979, of the precursor to the present subsection 36(2), and the abandonment of the 'non-compellability' clause. This section of the paper will
highlight these as well as some of the more noteworthy changes that were
made to this provision.

67. CanadianConstitutionalCharter,1971, Doc. 13-CD-095-E, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer,
1971) Cat. No. Z2-1971/1. Bayefsky, supra note 18 at 217.
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Less than a year after the Victoria Charter had been delivered to
Canadians, the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of
Commons on the Constitution of Canada fully endorsed, in its Final
Report of March 16, 1972, the principles stated in Articles 46 and 47 on
Regional Disparities.68 More importantly, the Final Report illuminates
the legislators' thinking at that time on the relationship between two of the
principles stated in Article 46: The principle of "equal opportunity and
well being for all individuals in Canada" (para. (1)) and the obligation of
assuring "as nearly as possible, that essential public services of reasonable quality are available to all individuals in Canada" (para. (2)). The two
principles are said to follow logically from each other:
... the Constitution should provide that every Canadian should have
access to adequate Federal, Provincial and municipal services without
having to bear a disproportionate tax burden because of the region in which
he lives. This recommendation follows logically from our acceptance of
the principle of equality of opportunity for all Canadians.69
What makes this conclusion particularly enlightening is that it provides
a specific context by which the principle of "equal opportunity and well
being for all individuals in Canada" could be understood. Indeed, this
paragraph is vague when read on its own. The Joint Committee, however,
believed that "equal opportunity for all Canadians" leads logically to the
objective that "every Canadian should have access to adequate Federal,
Provincial and municipal services." Thus, equal opportunity for all
Canadians may be interpreted to include the availability to all Canadians
of essential public services of reasonable quality.
The draft form for a Proclamation of the Governor General, November
10, 1975, was a revised version of the Victoria Charter. As Prime Minister
Trudeau stated in a letter circulated to the premiers of the provinces, dated
March 31, 1976, changes to the provision on Regional Disparities were
cosmetic. 70 In fact, aside from collapsing Article 47 of the Victoria
Charter into Article 46, no further changes were made (see Appendix A,
Article 39).

68. "We endorse the conclusions of the First Ministers concerning regional disparities
[Feb.8-9, 1971 Working Session No.3] and we believe that Canadians fully support these
objectives and want to have them included in the Canadian Constitution." Catalogue no.
YC3-284/1-01. Bayefsky, supra note 18 at 247.
69. Catalogue no. YC3-284/1-01. Bayefsky, supra note 18 at 247.
70. "Part V, which is essentially Part VII of the Victoria Charter on Regional Disparities. The
presentation has been slightly altered but there is no change in substance whatever." Bayefsky,
supra note 18 at 313.
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(i) non-compellabilityabandoned
The first significant change to the wording of the non-compellability
provision appeared in The ConstitutionAmendment Bill, Bill C-60, given
first reading on June 20, 1978. What was previously a non-compellability
clause, respecting Parliamentary and provincial legislative authority, was
abandoned. The new section read as follows:
96. Without limiting or restricting the generality of the statement of aims
of the Canadian Federation set forth in section 4 of this Act and without
altering the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada or of the
legislatures of the provinces or the rights of any of them with respect to the
exercise of their legislative authority pursuant to law, the Parliament of
Canada and the legislatures of the provinces, together with the government
of Canada and the governments of the provinces, are committed pursuant
to the Constitution of Canada to
(a) promoting equal opportunities for social and economic well-being,
(b) assuring as nearly as is practicable the availability of essential
public services of reasonable quality, and
(c) furthering economic development to reduce disparities in opportunities for social and economic well-being and in the availability of
essential public services of reasonable quality
for the benefit of all individuals in Canada, wherever they may live. 71
Of immediate interest was the fact that the original proviso to this section,
"Without altering the distribution of powers and without compelling the
Parliament of Canada or the Legislatures of the Provinces to exercise their
legislative powers . . ." was changed to the new phrase, "... . without
altering the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada or of the
legislatures of the Provinces or the rights of any of them with respect to
the exercise of their legislative authority pursuant to law.. . " The term
"compel" was dropped. This phrasing clearly varied the meaning of the
original statement. The new phrase identified 'rights' of the Parliament
of Canada and legislatures of the provinces which were not being altered.
The words "pursuant to law", however, were dropped from the revised
(1979) draft of this provision. Whereas the Parliament of Canada and the
legislatures of the provinces were previously free from compulsion (at
least under what had been the proposed art. 47) with respect to the
exercise of their legislative powers, an interdict which would have
precluded the courts' compelling the exercise of legislative powers, the
new phrase only sought to maintain in the clearest terms the legislatures'
existing rights with respect to the exercise of their legislative authority.

71.

Catalogue no. XB-303-60/1; Document no. 800-8/069. Bayefsky, supra note 18 at 386.
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The new phrase was so significantly different from the previous one that
its meaning was also changed. The clear intention in the earlier version
that the Parliament of Canada and the legislatures of the provinces could
not be compelled to exercise their legislative power was changed to a
statement which could not bear the same meaning.
How much of the original intent of "non-compellability" was meant to
abide remains a question. Was non-compellability only made weaker, or
was it abandoned for another intention altogether? One may reasonably
suggest that this phrase signified an entirely new intention: i.e., that noncompellability was dropped and replaced by a statement showing that the
constitutional statusquo was not being altered. This new phrase remained
intact and was included in the present s. 36. It would be entirely consistent
with the parties' respective positions to suggest that, through this new
wording, the provinces were seeking to prevent the section from being
construed as granting Ottawa any spending power rights additional to that
which may have existed prior to the enactment of s. 36. While the federal
government was trying to entrench the spending power via section 36, the
provinces inserted the new wording seeking to avoid just such an
outcome. As will be discussed in the conclusion of this paper, the
provincial attempts at preventing spending power entrenchment under
s. 36 appear to have been unsuccessful.
(ii) subsection (2): The Equalization Commitment
The precursor to the present subsection 36(2) first appeared in the "Best
Effort" Draft Proposals assembled for the Federal-Provincial First Ministers' Conference, Ottawa, February 5 & 6, 1979. Here for the first time,
explicit reference was made to equalization payments as a separate and
further commitment to those already listed under subsection (1). This
commitment flowed from the Parliament and the government of Canada
to the provinces, as opposed to the focus of s. 36(1) which was on
individual social and economic protections. The new subsection read:
(2) Parliament and the Government of Canada are further committed to
the principle of making equalization payments to the provinces that are
unable to provide essential public services of reasonable quality without
imposing an undue burden of taxation, or to the principle of making
payments to meet the commitarrangements equivalent to equalization
72
ment specified in Section 96(1)(c).

72.

Document no. 800-010/036. Bayefsky, supra note 18 at 565.
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The relevant historical question which arises at this juncture is why,
after eight years of relative consensus on the existing provision, the
present s. 36(1), should the provinces begin to seek a constitutional
assurance that the payments made pursuant to the equalization programme
would continue to be made to them by the federal government? Certainly,
if there were any provincial doubts about the viability of conditional or
unconditional grant programmes, those doubts would have been aired
earlier in the negotiation process. What led to this provision being
requested and included in the discussions on regional disparities?
In order to answer these questions, it will be important to recall that
conditional grant programmes were still relatively new even in the midseventies. Since most, in fact, had only been established in the late sixties,
the problems they triggered for both the federal and provincial governments did not begin to appear until the early seventies. For the federal
government, conditional grant programmes turned out to be more costly
than had been estimated. The fact that these programmes were fiscally
open-ended largely explains the rapid ballooning of costs. From their
inception, conditional grants had been designed as an equal sharing of the
costs of public services between the federal and provincial governments.
Since the provinces were in the position of providing the services,
however, it was the provinces that made and, thus, controlled the
expenditures for these services. For every dollar a province invested in
services which fell under the umbrella of a conditional grant programme,
it would receive fifty cents back from the federal government. Actual
programme costs, as determined by the provinces, governed the extent of
federal contributions in a given year. Thus, because the programmes did
not have fixed ceilings in place for how much a province could spend in
a particular field, and because some provinces did take advantage of a
"fifty cent" dollar to purchase more services at a higher quality, the level
of Ottawa's contributions rose at a rate alarming for the federal
government.

73

From the provincial side, the very structure of the programmes,
imposed by the federal government, led to inefficiency in the delivery of
services. In the field of medical care, for instance, federal contributions
were limited to services performed by doctors. As a result, provinces were
not free to use the lower-cost services of paramedics or nurses. In
addition, convalescent homes were under-utilized in favour of the much
more costly option of hospitalization, because convalescent homes, not
subject to federal approval, did not receive federal contributions.
73. G.E. Carter, "Established Programs Financing: A Critical Review of the Record" (1988)
36 Can. Tax J. 1225 at 1227.
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Structural inefficiencies such as these, as well as an open-ended fiscal
arrangement whereby the provinces could spend "fifty cent" dollars,
combined to force the federal government to seek cost cutting measures,
and to devise new arrangements that would give them more certainty over
their own expenditures in these areas. 74 In its attempt to adjust the
mechanics of conditional grant programmes in order to control their
costs, the federal government unilaterally instituted a number of measures. The following table has been included in order to convey the
magnitude of these federal actions for provincial treasuries and budget
calculations, and to illustrate the importance of conditional and unconditional grants for provincial revenue. The figures listed under each column
represent the percentages of federal conditional and unconditional grant
contributions in relation to a province's own gross revenues (POGR).
These figures relate to fiscal year 1975/76:
Major Federal-Provincial Financial Flows
1975/76
Province
Nfld.
P.E.I.
N.S.
N.B.
Que.
Ont.
Man.
Sask.
Alta.
B.C.

75

Conditional
26.2
25.2
32.1
26.9
20.7
22.1
24.3
18.6
12.3
16.2

76

Unconditional
51.0
57.5
50.8
43.3
16.0
16.8
8.8
-

These figures clearly illustrate the importance of federal conditional and
unconditional grant contributions for provincial revenue. Self evident,
too, should be the fact that even a small adjustment in the contributions
made to a province like P.E.I. or Nova Scotia would have a significant
impact on its budget planning.
In 1972, Ottawa modified the 1967 Post Secondary Education
programme by placing a ceiling on the federal overall contribution,
restricting its rise to a maximum of 15 percent annually.77 In 1973, the
federal government proposed a new formula for financing the medical

74. T.J. Courchene, Refinancing the Canadian Federation:A Survey of the 1977 Fiscal
Arrangements Act (Toronto: C.D. Howe Research Institute, 1979) at 11.
75. For medicare, hospital insurance, and postsecondary education.
76. Supra note 74 at 4.
77. T.J. Courchene, Social Canada in the Millennium (Toronto: C.D. Howe Research
Institute, 1994) at 110.
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care and hospital insurance programmes, one which would have given the
provinces responsibility for financing the programmes. The provinces
rejected the offer in 1974, however, because they considered the compensation offered as insufficient. 78 Then in July of 1975, the federal Minister
of Finance, Marc Lalonde, issued notice to the provincial governments
that agreements under the Hospital Insurance and DiagnosticServices
Act would be terminated as of July 15, 1980 (observing the mandatory
five year notice provision as required by the Act). Although he reassured
the provinces that new financing arrangements would come into place at
that time, if not sooner, Mr. Lalonde was quick to establish more
immediate cost cutting measures. In the 1975 federal budget, the Minister
of Finance placed ceilings on the rate of growth of federal per capita
contributions under the Medical Care Act. As part of the same federal
anti-inflation programme, contributions under the Medical Care Act
were rolled back even further in 1976. Both actions were made
79
unilaterally.
The resulting impact on provinces was severe. The unilateral imposition of limits on federal contributions, and the possible termination of at
least one conditional grant programme, brought instability to provincial
budget planning.80 Mounting provincial dissatisfactions gave way to
insecurity about the continued viability of conditional grant programmes
altogether. In the Prime Minister's address to the Federal-Provincial
Conference of First Ministers, Ottawa, June 14-15, 1976, on Established
Program Financing (EPF), yet another attempt to adjust conditional
grants, Prime Minister Trudeau acknowledged the atmosphere of uncertainty which had come to overshadow conditional grants:
Because of the difficulty in controlling costs, and federal uncertainty about
the future extent of its financial commitment, the federal government has
had to impose for two of the programs a ceiling on the rate of increase in
its contribution;
This has led to uncertainty on the part of the provinces about the extent of
continued federal participation or "partnership" in the programs in
question;"'

78. Report of the Parliamentary Task Force on Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements,
Fiscal Federalismin Canada(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1981) at 40.
79. Ibid. at 54.
80. Supra note 73 at 1227.
81. P.E. Trudeau, EstablishedProgramFinancing:A proposalregardingthe major sharedcost programsin the fields of health andpost-secondaryeducation (Ottawa: Queen's Printer,
1976) Document no. FP-8-003 at 4.
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This atmosphere of uncertainty also led Finance Minister, Donald S.
MacDonald, to state openly in the House of Commons that transfer
payments were "asource of tension and deception among federal and
82
provincial governments.
The 1977 EstablishedProgramsFinancingAct8 3 (EPF Act), was an
attempt to redress many of the problems which had arisen during the
previous decade of conditional grants. Perhaps the most notable adjustment in the grant programmes, in order to ensure that costs would not
escalate beyond the federal government's ability to meet them, was the
termination of the programmes' open-endedness. The cost of hospital
insurance, medicare and post secondary education programmes would no
longer be determined by actual programme costs, but by a formula which
placed fixed limits on federal contributions in these areas.
Despite these measures, however, the federal government soon became concerned that its contributions were still escalating at too high a
rate. In August and September of 1978, the Minister of Finance announced to the provinces his desire to re-negotiate, yet again, a new
formula that would see federal contributions increase at a slower rate:
The remaining $220 million [of expenditure cuts] which is included in the
reallocation package will have to be found in the major unconditional
transfer programs such as Equalization, the Canada Assistance Plan, the
proposed Social Services Act, Established Programs Financing, and other
programs. We have advised the provincial governments of our intention to
discuss the reduction of federal contributions to their municipalities. In
some cases, there are contractual obligations that must be re-negotiated.
As was their right under the Act, the provinces refused outright to renegotiate EPF and Ottawa responded by postponing for one year the
proposed Social Services Act, designed to provide provinces with addi85
tional resources.
The atmosphere of insecurity and tension surrounding transfer payments re-emerged. It was exacerbated when, in late 1978, the federal
government announced that it would unilaterally amend the equalization,
or unconditional grant, formula.86 In spite of the fact that the federal
government did enter into negotiations with the provinces over equalization payments, and that the structure of the programme emerged virtually
intact,87 the federal government's inconsistent, and at times contradictory
82. House of Commons Debates (18 February 1977) at 3205.
83. Federal-ProvincialFiscal Arrangements and FederalPost-SecondaryEducation and
Health ContributionsAct, S.C. 1976-77, c. 10.
84. Supra note 74 at 23.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid. at 1.
87. Ibid. at 30.
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steps, generated enormous provincial frustrations. Stop-gap measures,
unilaterally imposed by the federal government, had not only disrupted
provincial budget planning, but more importantly, had significantly
eroded provincial confidence in their federal partner's commitment to
conditional and unconditional grants. Provincial vulnerability to a federal
retreat from these programmes was based on the fact that many provinces
relied heavily on conditional and unconditional grants to augment their
revenues. The ultimate effect was that tension around transfer payments
spilled over into the constitutional arena.
In 1978, just as the federal government was announcing further limits
on its transfer payments to the provinces, members of the Senate took up
the issue at the Special Committee of the Senate on the Constitution of
Canada. Their First Report on regional disparities echoed the issue of
equalization which had been raised with Prime Minister Trudeau in 1976:
Your committee agrees that, in principle, the reduction of regional disparities is a matter that should be dealt with in the Constitution. The references
in the Bill are in clause 96 and in the Statement of Aims. It is noted,
however, that the operative clause does not give clear expression to the
question of ability to pay and does not create any enforceable obligation
to assure, as nearly as is practicable, that each province is able to supply
to its people a national average level of public services without a greater
burden of taxation than the national average.
The matter of making this commitment enforceable is obviously a difficult
one and your committee recommends that it be given further consideration
by an appropriate Senate committee.88
In light of the federal government's record of unilaterally shrinking
transfer payments the move by the provinces to secure some guarantee for
continued federal transfer payments for the equalization programme
continued on the heels of the Senate hearings. Discussions at the Continuing Committee of Ministers on the Constitution, Toronto, December 1416, 1978, focused on specific proposals that would curb the arbitrary
character of federal actions. The Committee as a whole sought some
formula which the federal government could be compelled to follow.
Those provinces which relied more heavily on federal money sought
minimum guarantees to secure some certainty for themselves about the
amount and timing of federal equalization contributions:

88.

Proceedingsof the Special Committee of the Senate (18 October 1978) at 5. Bayefsky,

supra note 18 at 434.
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Governments should examine together, with a view to possible further
constitutional change at a later stage:
(1) the practical possibility of a constitutional provision which would
spell out, by principles or formulae, the minimum help to be guaranteed to
poorer provinces respecting levels of services and the levels of taxation
required to finance them;
(2) the practical possibility of a federal-provincial equalization system
towards which both levels of government might contribute, with all
governments perhaps giving a certain percentage of their total revenues for
distribution in accordance with principles or formulae.89
A month after the Continuing Committee made these proposals, the Task
Force on Canadian Unity specifically recommended the following:
With respect to the sharing of Canadian wealth:
i - the constitution should recognize and entrench the principle of
equalizing social and economic opportunities between regions as an
objective of the federation, and it should be the responsibility of the central
government to maintain a system of equalization payments.
ii - a program of provincial revenue equalization along the lines of
current arrangements should be maintained.
iii - for the purpose of better balancing provincial resources with the
developmental requirements of their economies a new type of equalization
program should be developed.
The Task Force explicitly noted that it was the responsibility of the
federal government to maintain a system of equalization payments in
order to achieve the objective of alleviating regional disparities. Such
specific denotation of the federal government's fiscal responsibility
underscored the provinces' desire to ensure that the federal government
maintain its contributions to permit them to maintain public services.
The even more explicit recommendation of paragraph ii, referred to
equalization payments as "revenue equalization". This was a direct
reference to unconditional grants, as these monies were meant to equalize
provincial revenues between the have and have-not provinces. The
recommendation that unconditional grants be maintained "along the lines
of current arrangements", as recommended by the Task Force, reflected
the provinces' apprehension that the federal government may one day
abandon the transfer payments, or at least unilaterally curtail them to the
serious detriment of provinces.
In the midst and as a result of, the existing atmosphere of tension,
uncertainty and distrust between Ottawa and the provinces over federal

89. Meeting of the Continuing Committee of Ministers on the Constitution (Toronto: 14-16
December 1978) Document no. 830-67/033. Bayefsky, supra note 18 at 526.
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transfer payments, subsection (2) of the provision on regional disparities
was included for the first time for discussion at the Federal-Provincial
First Ministers' Conference, on February 5-6, 1979. This subsection
reads:
(2) Parliament and the Government of Canada are further committed to
the principle of making equalization payments to the provinces that are
unable to provide essential public services of reasonable quality without
imposing an undue burden of taxation, or to the principle of making
arrangements equivalent to equalization payments to meet the commitment specified in Section 96(l)(c).
The subsection was clearly dedicated to ensuring that the federal government continue to make contributions to the provinces, at least to those
which could not provide essential public services of a reasonable quality
without imposing an undue burden of taxation. The alternative in this
subsection, that the federal government be committed to making arrangements equivalent to equalization payments to meet the commitment
specified in s. 96(1)(c), was equally reassuring to the provinces. In short,
the entire subsection was meant to ensure that the federal government be
bound by some constitutional commitment to the continued making of
transfer payments for equalization. Given the history of unilateral federal
adjustments to provincial transfers, it is clear why the have-not provinces
in particular would have sought such a provision. However, the provinces
were not content with the relatively weak wording of subsection (2). A
revised and simpler draft of the provision appeared in the October 6, 1980
Proposed Resolution for Joint Address to Her Majesty the Queen
Respecting the Constitution of Canada:
(2) Parliament and the government of Canada are committed to taking
such measures as are appropriate to ensure that provinces are able to
provide the essential public services referred to in paragraph (1)(c) without
imposing an undue burden of provincial taxation.'
Although this provision was an assurance to the provinces that federal
contributions would continue, the provinces felt that it was still too vague
and they raised the issue at every opportunity.
Addressing the Senate on October 28, 1980, Saskatchewan Senator
Buckwold reflected his province's sentiments on the new provision:

90. Proposed Resolution for Joint Address to Her Majesty the Queen Respecting the
Constitution of Canada, Tabled in the House of Commons and the Senate (Ottawa: Queen's
Printer, 1980) Catalogue no. YC3-321/5-57. Bayefsky, supra note 18 at 752.

346 The Dalhousie Law Journal

On the equalization formula, our premier has suggested that:
- direct reference be made to "equalization payments" as opposed to the
vague reference toTo quote the words of the resolution:
9
- "taking such measures as are appropriate." '
Three days later, Senator Tremblay rose in the Senate to press the
provinces' intentions with respect to subsection (2):
A mention of equalization in that paragraph was expected. But no, because
equalization is characterized by annual payments which tend to transform
equalization into provincial revenue. The reason for equalization is given
but not the essential requirement. It is presented only under a negative
aspect, namely to avoid an undue burden of provincial taxation. Perhaps
it refers also to equalization payments which would enable provinces to
in that
avoid an undue taxation burden. But why not say it directly? It9 is
2
sense that equalization payments should have been referred to.
Senator Stewart argued the same point in the Senate on that day:
I wish now to talk about equalization, which was mentioned by Senator
Tremblay. I support what the honourable senator said, that we do not want
just a pious statement in the Constitution that we are in favour of
equalization. We want a firm statement that equalization payments-I
emphasize the word "Payments"-will continue to be made.93
This pressure was redoubled in other fora on the Constitution. The
provinces were determined to gain, inasmuch as possible, their guarantee
for federal equalization payments. Finally, in the final months of negotiation, the federal government came as close to the province's position
as they would go. Speaking to the Special Joint Committee of the Senate
and the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada on January 12,
1981, then Minister of Justice, Jean Chr6tien assented to the use of the
term "equalization payments":
Both the Premiers Hatfield and Blakeney and many members of this
Committee have made representations to the effect that Section 31(2)
should state clearly that equalization payments must be made to provincial
governments. I am prepared to accept wording somewhat along the
following lines:
31(2) Parliament and the government of Canada are further committed to
the principle of making equalization payments to ensure that provincial
governments have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable
levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation.94

91.
92.
93.
94.

Debates of the Senate (28 October 1980) at 993.
Debates of the Senate (31 October 1980) at 1094.
Debates of the Senate (31 October 1980) at 1104.
Proceedingsof the Special Committee of the Senate (12 January 1981) at 36:19.
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The new provision was acceptable; and the amendment passed on
January 30, 1981. It would remain virtually unchanged and become
subsection 36(2) in the Constitution Act, 1982.
Of importance in the history of s. 36 is the fact that subsection (2) did
not belong to the provision until 1979, eight years after the original
formulation of the section in the Victoria Charter. Nor had there been
reason for the provinces to insist on it initially. Only after time had passed
and economic pressures on the federal government had resulted in a
squeeze on provincial treasuries did the provinces become concerned.
Numerous unilateral actions by the federal government to control the
costs of open-ended programmes, and at least one attempt to restructure
unconditional grants altogether, had led to an atmosphere of tension and
distrust between the provinces and the federal government. Finally, the
provinces had fought for an assurance, at the constitutional level, that
equalization payments would continue. The present subsection 36(2) is
the fruit of their combined efforts.
II. Strength of the Commitment
Under s. 36(1), Parliament and the government of Canada are committed
to promoting, furthering and providing those concerns listed under (a),
(b) and (c).
How strong is this commitment?
1. Is it justiciable?
2. If it is, then
(a) does this pledge create enforceable rights, or
(b) are there other non-coercive remedies available?
3. What is the relative strength of this commitment?
4. What is the content of this commitment?
1. Justiciability
Canadian courts have taken an expansive view of what is justiciable in the
constitutional context, imposing limits on themselves only in those
questions that are purely political in nature or that lack objective criteria
for judicial scrutiny. 95 In Reference re Constitution of Canada,96 the
Supreme Court of Canada was asked to determine whether the constitutional convention requiring unanimous consent of the provinces to amend

95. B.L. Strayer, The Canadian Constitution and the Court--the Function and Scope of
JudicialReview, 2d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) at 195-212.
96. [1981] 1 S.C.R. 745 (sub nom. PatriationReference).
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the Constitution was enforceable. The majority of the Court rejected the
Government of Canada's claim that the issue was non-justiciable, because it would lead the Court into the political as well as legislative
arenas, and quoted approvingly from the lower Court's decision on the
same case 97, per Freedman, C.J.M.:
In my view, this submission goes too far. Its characterization... as purely
political overstates the case. That there is a political element embodied in
the question, arising from the contents of the joint address, may well be the
case. But that does not end the matter. If Question 2, even if in part political,
possesses a constitutional feature, it would legitimately call for our reply.
In my view, the request for a decision by this Court on whether there is a
constitutional convention, in the circumstances described, that the Dominion will not act without the agreement of the Provinces poses a question
that is, at least in part, constitutional in character. It therefore calls for an
answer, and I propose to answer it.98
This position of the Court has been affirmed by subsequent cases,
Reference re Objection by Quebec to a Resolution to amend the Constitution99 , OperationDismantle"° in 1985, and the reference Re Canada
Assistance Plan' in 1991.
The action brought by a peace organization in OperationDismantle
sought a declaration from the Court that the Canadian Government's
decision to permit the United States to test "cruise missiles" in Canada
was a violation of the Charter of Rights. Wilson J., speaking on behalf of
a unanimous Court on this issue, stated that if a case raised the question
of whether the executive violated the Constitution, then the case would
be heard, regardless of the political nature of the dispute:
I would conclude, therefore, that if we are to look at the Constitution for
the answer to the question whether it is appropriate for the courts to
"second guess" the executive on matters of defense, we would conclude
that it is not appropriate. However, if what we are being asked to do is to
decide whether any particular act of the executive violates the rights of the
citizens, then it is not only appropriate that we answer the question; it is our
obligation under the Charterto do so."°'
Although an action based on s. 36 may be distinguished from the Court's
decision in OperationDismantle on the grounds that s. 36 falls outside

97. Re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada (1981), 117 D.L.R. (3d) 1.
98. Ibid. at 13. This was reiterated in Re Objection by Quebec to a Resolution to amend the
Constitution, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793 at 805.
99. Re Objection, ibid.
100. OperationDismantle v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441.
101. Re Canada Assistance Plan, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525.
102. Supra note 100 at 472. Wilson J.'s opinion was a separate concurrence, but on this issue

Dickson J., who wrote for the rest of the Court, agreed with her: ibid. at 459.
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the Charter,it could be reasonably advanced that legislative or executive
action which allegedly violates any part of the Constitution could be
scrutinized by the Court. Re CanadaAssistancePlan is squarely on point
with this position.
Re CanadaAssistance Plan arose because the federal budget of 1990
put a five per cent cap on CAP payments to the "have" provinces of
Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia under what to that point had been
a regime of open-ended cost-sharing agreements. Although the controversy between the provinces and the federal government was a political
one, the legal question raised in Re CanadaAssistancePlan was whether
the federal government could constitutionally amend shared-cost agreements with the provinces? The Supreme Court of Canada held that a
"sufficient legal component" existed in the questions posed by the
reference °3 to warrant hearing, and went on to hold that there were no
prohibitions in Canada's constitutional law that would invalidate the
proposed legislation.
An action based on s. 36(1) will turn on the question of whether either
the federal or provincial governments have failed to meet their commitment to promote, further or provide for the undertakings listed under (a),
(b) or (c), thus violating this provision of the Constitution. An action
based on s. 36(2) will raise the question of whether the federal government has violated this provision of the Constitution by having failed to
meet its commitment to the principle of making equalization payments in
order to ensure that provincial governments have sufficient revenues to
provide reasonably comparable levels of public services at reasonably
comparable levels of taxation.
Both questions must have a "constitutional feature" (perReference re
Constitution of Canada), or a "sufficient legal component" (per Re
Canada Assistance Plan), however, in order to avoid being purely
political and thus non-justiciable. On these tests, s. 36 is as justiciable as
all other provisions of the ConstitutionAct, 1982.
2. Remedy
a. Coercive Remedies
Given that s. 36 is justiciable, does it create enforceable obligations?
Opinion would appear to be divided. On the one hand, Michael Robert,
Commissioner for the Royal Commission on Economic Union and

103. Supra note 101 at 546.
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Development Prospects for Canada, for example, suggested in 1985 that
Canadians may now, as a result of s. 36, go before the courts and seek a
remedy saying: "My provincial government, or any federal government,
is not respecting its commitment to provide me with essential public
services of reasonable quality.""° On the other hand, Senator Smith,
participating in the Senate debates of November 3, 1980, expressed
reservation about the enforceability of s. 36: "Look at this how you will,
there is not a single chance-not even the proverbial snowball's chanceof enforcing this commitment as it is written ....,105
Divergence of opinion on the enforceability of a constitutional provision has rarely been so extreme. Although Senator Smith did not specify
the basis for his concerns, it may lie in the comparatively open-textured
nature of the obligation, styled as a 'commitment'. In addition, the more
general wording of the individual equity provision in s. 36(1) and the
commitment to the 'principle of equalization' in s. 36(2) lacked the same
degree of specificity which other parts of the Constitution initiative
contained. Moreover, given the nature of the constitutional undertaking,
a commitment, it is more difficult to conceive of the Courts applying the
provision to force Parliament or the legislatures to take action. If the
Courts were to find that either Parliament or the provincial legislatures
had breached their commitments under s. 36 and thereby violated the
Constitution, it may be the case that the Courts would not be at liberty to
order a mandatory remedy pursuant to s. 52 of the Constitution. Subsection one of that provision reads:
52(1) The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada and any
law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the
extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect. °6
Striking down the offending legislation, severing the offending segment
of the legislation, and reading into a statute in the case of under-inclusive
legislation, are all remedies available to the Court under s. 52107 for
redressing unconstitutional laws.

104. M. Robert, "Challenges and Choices: Implications for Fiscal Federation" in T.J.
Courchene, D.W. Conklin & G.C.A. Cook, eds., Ottawa and the Provinces: the Distribution

of Money and Power (Toronto: Ontario Economic Council, 1985) at 28.
105. Debates of the Senate (3 November 1980) at 1143. Senator Smith was speaking to
s. 31(1) of the ProposedResolutionforJointAddress to HerMajesty the Queen Respectingthe

Constitution of Canada,the October 6, 1980 draft of s. 36. Subsection one of each draft is
nearly identical while subsection two differs considerably between them.
106. Supra note 3.
107.

Shachter v. CanadaEmployment and Immigration Commission, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679.
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b. DeclaratoryRelief
If a court were to hold, on an action based on s. 36, that either Parliament
or the provincial legislatures had failed to meet their commitment, then
it would appear that an appropriate remedy would be a declaration that the
legislative body in question is acting contrary to their constitutional
commitment. Considerable authority in both statutes as well as the rules
of court exist to enable the Court to make "binding declarations of right,
whether or not any consequential relief is or could be claimed."'' 0
Accordingly, upon a justiciable claim against either Parliament or the
provincial legislatures for an alleged breach of their commitment pursuant to s. 36, a Court may declare that the offending action is contrary to
their constitutional commitment without thereby attempting to encroach
unduly on legislative autonomy. Between hearing ajusticiable claim and
deciding the matter on its merits, however, a Court will first have to
ascertain the strength of Parliament and the provincial legislatures'
"commitment" under s. 36.
3. Relative Strength of the 'Commitment'
Once a Court decides to consider an alleged breach of Parliament or the
provincial legislatures' "commitment" under s. 36(1), it will inevitably
have to rule first on the relative strength of this commitment. One
suggestion is that this commitment only identifies "objectives" which
Parliament and the provincial legislatures have adopted, albeit in a nonbinding manner. This is a tempting approach, as it would resolve the
apparent contradiction between a constitutional commitment and the
unavailability of mandatory remedies. An alternate view is that, as a
"constitutional commitment", Parliament and the provincial legislatures
have a greater than usual duty to realize the objects of their commitment.
This approach would suggest a much stronger commitment or pledge,
whereby a government may be found to be in breach for relatively less
grave actions. The interpretive issue at hand stems from the fact that,
although the word "commit" is not normally used when a legal duty is
being created, it is nonetheless a term which conveys a strong sense of

108. JudicatureAct, R.S.A. 1980, c. J- 1, s. 11; Rules of Court,Alta. Reg. 390/68 (O.C.2208/
68), r. 410(c), (e); Supreme Court Rules, B.C. Reg. 310/76, as amended r. 5(22); The Queen's
Bench Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. C-280, s. 63, r. 8; Rules of the Supreme Court, scheduled to the
JudicatureAct, C.S. Nfld. 1916, c. 83,0-24, r. 53; Civil ProcedureRules and RelatedRules,
r. 5.14; Courts ofJustice Act, S.O. 1984, c. 11, s. 110; Civil ProcedureRules, r. 5.14; Queen's
Bench Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. Q-1, s. 45(17); Federal Court Rules, C.R.C. 1978, c. 663, as
amended by SOR/79-57 and SOR/79-58, r. 1723.
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"obligation", "binding", and "pledge" according to the Webster's
Dictionary.109 The Oxford Dictionary gives the meaning of "commit" as
"to entrust," and "to pledge, bind (esp. oneself) to a certain course or
policy."'t 0 The Oxford English Dictionaryincludes a useful reference to
the French verb engager,the verb used in the French version of s. 36 for
the word "commit". The French term is said to mean:
an absolute moral choice of a course of action; hence, the state of being
involved in political or social questions, or in furthering a political or social
question, or in furthering a particular doctrine or course.'
Thus, Parliament and the provincial legislatures are "pledged", "bound",
"obligated" and "entrusted" with promoting, furthering and providing for
(a), (b) and (c). The French term engager,used in the French version of
this provision, adds strength to the use of "commit" by suggesting that
Parliament and the provincial legislatures have made an "absolute"
commitment to "furthering a particular doctrine or course".
It is also noteworthy that the commitment under s. 36(1) is not
qualified by the word "principle", as is the federal commitment under
s. 36(2): "Parliament and the government of Canada are committed to the
." Under s. 36(1)(c), for
principle of making equalization payments ....
instance, the commitment is not to the "principleof providing essential
public services," nor is it, for that matter, to the "objective of providing
essential public services," but it is rather an unqualified commitment: "to
providing essential public services." As such, the commitment under
s. 36(1) must be regarded as being substantially stronger even than the
commitment found in s. 36(2). The view that the commitment under
s. 36(1) connotes "objectives" or "principles" of government action,
then, is untenable. Rather than objectives, the commitment in this
provision more closely resembles an obligation.
Drafters of the 1982 Constitution spoke in terms of entrenching this
"obligation" when referring to s. 36. In addressing the House of Commons about the newly tabled ProposedResolutionfor Joint Address to
Her Majesty the Queen Respecting the Constitution of Canada (the
ConstitutionAct, 1980), then Minister of Justice Jean Chr6tien said, with
respect to the undertakings found under s. 36, (then s. 31):

109. Webster's New CollegiateDictionary(Toronto: G. & C. Merriam Co., 1974).
110. J.M. Hawkins & R. Allen, eds., The Oxford Encyclopedic English Dictionary(Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1991).
111. J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner, eds., The OxfordEnglishDictionary(Oxford: Clarendon

Press, 1989).
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Sharing the wealth has become a fundamental right of Canadians and that
is why the resolution entrenches the principle of equalization and commits
both orders of government to promoting equal opportunities for the wellbeing of Canadians; furthering economic development to reduce disparity
in opportunities and, specifically, providing essential public services of
reasonable quality to all Canadians.
By entrenching this principle in the constitution, we are enshrining the
obligation of sharing which has been fundamental to the Canadian experience."'
On October 14, 1980, Senator Perrault, Senate Leader of the Government, reiterated, almost verbatim, Minister Chr6tien's comments of the
previous week:
The Constitution Act, 1980, entrenches the principle of equalization
and commits both orders of Government to promoting equal opportunities
for the well being of Canadians, furthering economic development to
reduce disparity and opportunities, and specifically providing essential
public services of reasonable quality to all Canadians....
This practice of sharing has become a fundamental principle of Canadian federalism. "3

If the practice of sharing had become a "fundamental principle of
Canadian Federalism", "a fundamental right of Canadians," and if the
drafters of the Constitution had entrenched this principle in order "to
enshrine the obligationof sharing," then the depth of Parliament's and the
provincial legislatures' commitment certainly extended to the level of a
"constitutional obligation". This depth of commitment was also the most
appropriate interpretation of the term "commit" as it most closely
dovetails with the meaning of "engager", the term used in the French
version of this provision.
Over and above the Parliamentary speeches pronounced by Senator
Perrault and Minister Chrrtien, the tradition of sharing was further
underscored for the people of Canada. In 1982, the federal government
published and made available to Canadians an information booklet
entitled, The Constitution and You, 4 the preface of which reads:
This booklet is published by the Government of Canada in the interest of
contributing to public understanding and awareness of the constitutional
resolution approved by Parliament in December of 1981.
Under chapter 6, "The Right and Responsibility of Sharing", Canadians
were told about The Traditionof Sharing:"By guaranteeing it in writing,

112. House of Commons Debates (6 October 1980) at 3287.
113. Debates of the Senate (14 October 1980) at 853.
114. The Constitution and You (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1982) Cat. no. CP
45-23/1982.
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we are simply recognizing a tradition that was established in our country
from the beginning."' 5 This tradition of sharing, which, according to the
booklet, was guaranteed in the Constitution, committed the legislatures to
the concerns under (a), (b) and (c) of s. 36(1):
A constitutional commitment
The principle of sharing, written into the constitutional resolution and

passed by the Parliament of Canada, commits both federal and provincial
governments to:
- promoting equal opportunities for the well-being of all Canadians
- furthering economic development to reduce disparity in opportunities
- providing essential
public services of reasonable quality to all
6
Canadians.' 1
Thus, this tradition or principle of sharing undergirded the commitment
under s. 36(1). It was described repeatedly in the booklet as being
"written into the constitution" and as being 'guaranteed in writing'. If this
tradition of sharing were "written into the constitution" by virtue of
Parliament and the provincial legislatures' commitment under s. 36(1),
then that commitment must bear the force of strength attributed to the
tradition of sharing. Standing on its own in this booklet, the strength of
this tradition is indeed profound: "By guaranteeing it in writing, we are
simply recognizing a tradition that was established in our country from
the beginning." Add to this statement the comments made by Justice
Minister Chr6tien: "[b]y entrenching this principle in the constitution, we
are enshrining the obligation of sharing which has been fundamental to
the Canadian experience," and by Mr. Perrault: "[t]his practice of sharing
has become a fundamental principle of Canadian federalism." Taken
cumulatively together with the statements made by the federal government in its booklet, the inescapable conclusion is that the commitment
under s. 36(1) is of the most significant nature, and must bear at least the
strength of a "constitutional obligation".
Prime Minister Trudeau did not comment a great deal on this particular
provision, yet his government's intention in the use of the term "committed" is reflected in the course of comments he made about the equalization
programme and its proposed entrenchment in the Constitution:
the hon. member is raising is a constitutional type of question.... The hon.
member knows that these are the payments that we propose to guarantee
in the constitutionalproject before the House....

115. Ibid. at 20.
116. Ibid. at 21 [emphasis added].
117. House of Commons Debates (5 December 1980) at 5397 [emphasis added].
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Prime Minister Trudeau's statement in the House of Commons clearly
affirms the Minister of Justice and the Senate Leader of the Government's
intentions that under s. 36(1) the term 'committed' under s. 36(1) is at
least a "constitutional obligation", if not a "constitutional guarantee" as
stated by the Prime Minister.
Parliament and the provincial legislatures' commitment under s. 36(1)
is made stronger still in light of the fact that from the 1971 Victoria
Charter until the 1977 Draft Resolution Respecting the Constitution of
Canada,the various drafts of the present s. 36 had systematically stated
that the provision shall not compel the Parliamentof Canada or Legislatures of the Provinces to exercise their legislative powers' 18 Clearly,
the drafters of the earlier version had contemplated an unambiguous noncompulsion clause by the use of the term "compel". The fact that a noncompulsion clause was initially considered and then subsequently abandoned has the effect of making the s. 36(1) commitment even stronger.
Until 1978, Parliament and the provincial legislatures could not have
been compelled to exercise their legislative power despite their commitment; there was no way to force them to abide by their commitment if they
should renege. However, after 1978, through the ConstitutionAct, 1982,
Parliament and the provincial legislatures became subject to judicial
review if they breached their commitment. As a result, the commitment
itself became stronger. The question that remains is, what government
action would constitute a violation of this obligation?
4. The Content of Governments' Commitment
a. Section 36(1)
Although a ruling of a court will ultimately be based on the specific facts
of a case, the content of Parliament and the provincial legislatures'
commitment under s. 36 are ultimately gleaned from the wording of the
section. Pursuant to s. 36(1), Parliament and the provincial legislatures
are committed to:

118. Article 47: The provisions of this Part shall not have the effect of altering the distribution
of powers and shall not compel the Parliament of Canada or Legislatures of the Provinces to
exercise their Legislative powers. Canadian ConstitutionalCharter, 1971, supra note 78.
Article 22: Without altering the distribution of powers and without compelling the Parliament
of Canada or the Legislatures of the Province to exercise their legislative powers. ... Draft
Resolution Respecting the Constitution of Canada,Debates of the Senate (2 February 1977)
at 297-303.
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a) promoting equal opportunities for the well-being of Canadians;
b) furthering economic development to reduce disparities in opportunities; and
c) providing essential public services of reasonable quality to all Canadians.
Pursuant to s. 36(2), the commitment by Parliament is to "the principle of
making equalization payments to ensure that provincial governments
have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable levels of
public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation." In both
instances, the subsections anticipate the kind of government action that
resulted. At a glance, subsection (2) will appear more general than the
three provisions under subsection (1). Under subsection (2), Parliament
is committed to making some kind of equalization payments. These are
left undefined since the provision speaks only to the "principleof making
equalization payments". The general object of these payments is to
ensure that provincial governments have sufficient revenues (i.e.: the
fiscal ability) to provide reasonably comparable levels of public services
at reasonably comparable levels of taxation. Subsection 36(1) is a much
narrower provision in that its concern is that of individual equity and in
identifying the public services towards which national standards should
apply. Parliament and the provincial legislatures are committed to promoting equality of opportunities for all Canadians; in other words, the
promotion of individual self-fulfillment and, with it, the possibility of
meaningful participation in society.
Disparity in economic strength between and within regions will
naturally lead to greater economic opportunities for individual Canadians
living in more prosperous regions, and less for those Canadians living in
less prosperous regions or, indeed, for poor Canadians living in prosperous regions. Accordingly, in order to promote equal opportunities for
Canadians inequalities in economic opportunities would naturally have
to be addressed, paragraph (a). The paragraph (b) of ss. 36(1) commits
Parliament and the provincial legislatures to furthering economic development in order to reduce such disparity in opportunities for Canadians.
Thus, paragraph (b) ensues from paragraph (a), identifying as it does one
approach which governments are committed to pursuing in order to
promote equal opportunities for Canadians. The second dimension of
regional disparities exists at the level of public services delivery. Provincial abilities to provide public services, and indeed, the demand for
services such as welfare, will vary according to a province's economic
strength. Without federal contributions, many provinces (particularly in
the Maritime region) would not be able to provide their residents with
public services at the standard enjoyed by Canadians living in more
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prosperous regions. Accordingly, regional disparities in public services
is another way in which Canadians do not have the benefit of equal
opportunities. The logic found in this section (Article 46 of the Victoria
Charter) remains the cohesive force behind ss. 36(1).
In addition to reducing disparities in economic opportunities (para.
(b)) so as to promote equal opportunities for Canadians (para. (a)),
legislators fully intended that access to essential public services should
also be ensured in order to promote equal opportunities for Canadians,
thus para. (c). Numerous conditional grants fall under the purview of each
commitment respectively. While the actual conditional grant programmes
which fulfill each commitment will naturally vary, the standard by which
governments must abide will be different for each commitment under
s. 36(1). The commitment under (b) is to furthering economic development. "Furthering" is a word which has a "progressive" connotation. By
contrast, the commitment to providing does not have the same progressive quality. Under paragraph (b), as long as Parliament and the legislatures act to further, or progressively realize, economic development, then
they would be found to be acting in accordance with this standard. This
characteristic of progressive realization cannot be attributed to the
commitment under paragraph (c). The word "providing" therein lacks
that progressive quality. Accordingly, the standard by which a court must
judge legislation with respect to s. 36(1) is higher for paragraph (c),
because the commitment is to actually making something available,
providing something.
The commitment under ss. 36(1) is also more substantive and 'downto-earth' as one moves from paragraph (a) successively to paragraph (c).
Paragraph (a) identifies the object of the section as a whole, individual
equity, but does not contain a substantive content per se, aside from the
general equality provision. Paragraph (b) provides that Parliament and
the provincial legislatures mustfurther economic development, but, due
to the progressive nature of the word "further", this provision is to be
realized progressively. Thus, the standard of government action under
paragraph (b) must be progressive realization of economic development.
Regressive government action, or government inaction with the effect
that economic development ceases to move forward, or be progressively
realized, would naturally fall short of this standard. Paragraph (c)
contains the highest standard of government action. Rather than progressive realization, paragraph (c) commits Parliament and the provincial
legislatures simply to the realization, or provision, of specific objects:
essential public services of reasonable quality. Under this provision, it is
not enough for governments to "work towards" providing essential
public services. Governments must provide them. Governments must
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also provide essential public services which (i) meet a standard of
reasonableness, and (ii) are available to all Canadians. These are two
further standards which must be observed in the provision of essential
public services. The provincial legislatures are expected to meet their
responsibilities under this section differently from the role anticipated of
Parliament and the federal government. The provinces have powers
different from Parliament's, and each is expected to play its distinct role
according to its respective powers.
According to the division of powers in the ConstitutionAct, 1867, the
provinces have authority over the areas of health, education and welfare.
Thus, the provinces are responsible for passing legislation which would
govern the provision of these essential services. Provincial responsibility
pursuant to s. 36(l)(c), then, would entail the exercise of provincial
legislative authority to establish and regulate health, education and
welfare programmes in the province. It is also incumbent on the provinces
to guarantee legislatively that these programmes be of a "reasonable
quality", as per s. 36(l)(c). The actual qualitative standard, however,
would not be solely supervised by the provinces. A minimum standard
must be determined by the federal government based on criteria contained in conditional grant programmes because only the federal government can set standards which would apply nationally. In other words,
provinces would be financially penalized if they delivered services which
failed to meet federally set national standards. The assumptions would
follow that the provinces could provide higher standards of services to
their residents if they so wished.
The content of the federal commitment under s. 36(1)(c) requires
somewhat more from Parliament and the federal government than that
which is expected from the provincial legislatures. As already noted, the
federal government is also implicated in the commitment to providing
essential public services "of reasonable quality." In addition, only the
federal government can meet that part of the commitment which pledges
that essential public services would be provided to "all Canadians". The
national scope of this element of the commitment under s. 36(1)(c) would
naturally preclude exclusive provincial responsibility with respect to this
undertaking. 19

119. Indeed, this very element in paragraph (c) had been used by the federal government to
argue that only Parliament was suited to consider and assert the national interest as opposed
to provincial concerns, and that as a result, Parliament should have clear recognition of its
spending power in order for it to attend to the national interest in the provision of provincial
public services.
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Providing essential public services to "all Canadians" clearly anticipates and sets the standard that these services will be both universal and
accessible. Firstly, because "all Canadians" are to receive essential public
services, regional or provincial boundaries must not impede the provision
or the universal availability of these services. 20 In other words, Canadians in Newfoundland must receive broadly similar essential public
services as those that would be available to Canadians in Saskatchewan
or British Columbia. Secondly, Canadians moving from one province to
another must not be hindered from receiving the benefit of essential
public services as provided by the province to which they move or from
which they have moved.
The universal availability of essential public services is, alone, insufficient to meet the federal commitment under s. 36(l)(c). What must
concomitantly attend universal availability is the principle of accessibility. If "all Canadians" are to be provided with essential public services,
then all residents of a province must, in principle, have access to each
programme. The federal commitment of providing essential public
services to "all Canadians" will thus only be met if those services (i) are
made universally available, (ii) preclude a residency requirement in any
particular province, and (iii) are accessible. These, in fact, are the broad
conditions which the federal government has placed on its grants to the
provinces in the health and welfare areas in order to ensure that equal
opportunity with respect to essential public services is achieved. These
conditions also provide much of the foundation for national standards in
the provision of essential public services, establishing, as they do,
national availability and accessibility to provincial public services.
The last element in the cement of the foundation for national standards
speaks to the standard of "reasonableness" in the provision of essential
public services. As a principle, "comprehensiveness" will suggest that
each programme provide an adequate range and quality of services in
order to meet its commitment, be it in the field of education, health or
welfare. Thus, the provision of essential public services of "reasonable
quality" to "all Canadians" will require the federal government to place,
as a condition for the receipt of federal grant monies, the stipulation that
provincial programmes meet a standard of comprehensiveness and
intrinsic adequacy. This standard of comprehensiveness will be the

120. This principle has often been referred to as "portability", i.e. that Canadians can "take
with them" their right to essential public services when they move from one province to
another. This principle has also been incorporated into conditional grants as that condition
which prohibits a province from imposing a residency requirement before a Canadian can
receive the services they require.
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minimum by which provinces must abide in order for them to meet their
commitment of providing essential public services of"reasonable quality".
The content of the federal commitment under s. 36(1)(c), then, will
exceed the mere provision of fiscal assistance to the provinces. Since only
Parliament has the responsibility for "all Canadians", and because only
Parliament can impose conditions nationally in order to ensure that
essential public services of reasonable quality be provided to "all Canadians", Parliament and the federal government must do more than
provide monetary grants to the provinces. In order to meet its commitment under s. 36(l)(c), Parliament and the federal government must also
place conditions on the use of federal grants to the provinces in order to
ensure that "all Canadians" are provided with essential public services of
"reasonable quality".
The conditions which must be attached to federal transfer grants are
expressed broadly: universality, a prohibition on a residency requirement, accessibility, adequacy and comprehensiveness. If Parliament or
the federal government were to abandon any one of these conditions, then
it may be argued forcefully that the federal government is failing its end
of the commitment to provide essential public services of "reasonable
quality" to "all Canadians".
InternationalDocuments as Interpretive Guides
In order to determine the scope of Parliament's and the provincial
legislatures' obligation under this provision, it will be necessary to
examine Canada's international commitments which reflect the concerns
listed under (a), (b) and (c) of s. 36(1). Canadian courts have on numerous
occasions sought to interpret ambiguous statutes as far as possible in
accordance with Canada's international legal obligations."2 ' Two underlying reasons explain judicial regard for international treaties to which
Canada is a signatory. The first is that, by interpreting ambiguous statutes
in conformity with international law, legislation that would otherwise
lead to a breach of international law is made to accord with it. Thus, a
balance is sought between the supremacy of Parliament and the international legal system. Secondly, international law may be used as a
benchmark against which to measure a domestic statute's efficacy.
The Supreme Court has utilized international treaties as an aid to
interpreting both the Constitution as well as statutes. Dickson C.J.,
b.

121. Re Powers to Levy Rates on Foreign Legations, [1943] S.C.R. 208; see also E.A.
Dreidger, Constructionof Statutes, 2d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) at 215-16.
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dissenting in PSAC v. Canada,22 suggests that the principles of constitutional interpretation require that Canada's international obligations be
considered when construing the Charter:
Furthermore, Canada is a party to a number of international human rights
Conventions which contain provisions similar or identical to those in the
Charter. Canada has thus obliged itself internationally to ensure within its
borders the protection of certain fundamental rights and freedoms which
are also contained in the Charter.The general principles of constitutional
interpretation require that these international 23obligations be a relevant and
persuasive factor in Charterinterpretation.
Dickson C.J. cited his dissent in PSAC with approval in his majority
judgment in Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson.'2 4 The Chief
Justice further cited with approval both PSAC and Slaight Communications in R. v. Keegstra,125 where he relied upon the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination'2 6 and the
27
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Although the above cases involve the Charter, it should be recalled that
the Charter is only one part of the Constitution. As such, Dickson C.J.'s
earliest comments in PSAC about applying the general principles of
constitutional interpretation to the Charter must also bear on s. 36
interpretation. Thus, Canada's international obligations which relate to
"equal opportunities for the well-being of Canadians," per s. 36(1)(a),
"economic development to reduce disparity in opportunities," per
s. 36(l)(b), and "essential public services of reasonable quality," per
s. 36(l)(c), are not only important aids for interpretation, but in the Chief
Justice's words, should be "a relevant and persuasive factor" in interpreting this provision.
c.

InternationalConventions

International legal instruments such as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights are among the first full statements of social and economic
rights and have served as models both for regional conventions and for
national constitutions. To the extent that s. 36 of the Constitution entrusts

122. PSAC v. Canada,[1987] 1 S.C.R. 313.
123. Ibid. at 349.
124. Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038.
125. R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697.
126. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(1966), Can. T.S. 1970 No. 28, 5 I.L.M. 352.
127. InternationalCovenant on CivilandPoliticalRights,19 December 1966, Can. T.S. 1976
No. 47,999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368.
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Canadians' social and economic well-being to Parliament and the provincial legislatures, the Court should use international instruments such as
the above to inform the interpretation of s. 36(1) so as to determine
whether or not these legislative bodies are meeting their obligation under
s. 36(1).
The United Nations Charter makes it a duty for member states to
"promote... higher standards of living, full employment and conditions
of economic and social progress and development." As a member,
Canada is pledged to take both joint as well as separate action in
cooperation with the UN organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth. Canada's international pledge is made domestically to the
people of Canada under s. 36. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, adopted by the U.N. in 1948 with Canada's support, ensures the
right to social security, education, and an adequate standard of living
including food, clothing, housing and health and welfare. Again, these
rights are reflected to Canadians via s. 36.
The International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights' 28 supersedes other international documents for its comprehensiveness in the area of social and economic rights. Among the rights
which Canada has undertaken under the Covenant, to promote domestically, are the right to social security under article 9, the right to an
adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing and
housing under article 11, the right to the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health under article 12, and the right to education
under article 13.129
The implementation of the Covenant is based on the principle of
"progressive realization". Article 2(1) of the Covenant provides:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps,
individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources,
with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights
recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including
particularly the adoption of legislative measures.

128.

InternationalConvention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Can. T.S. 1976

No. 46.
129. The CanadaAssistance PlanAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. C- 1,which guarantees many of these
rights to Canadians, falls within the purview of s. 36(1) as a shared-cost program. These rights
include: the right to financial assistance for persons in need, s. 6(2)(a), the right to have the level
of financial assistance take into account each individual's budgetary requirements, s. 6(2)(b),
the fight to legal appeal procedures to challenge denials of financial assistance, s. 6(2)(e), and
the right not to be forced to work as a condition for receiving financial assistance, s. 15(3)(a).
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Although the principle of progressive realization is not a fixed standard
by which to measure compliance with s. 36(1), a standard is realized if the
corollary of this principle were advanced: the general obligation not to
take "deliberately retrogressive measures". 130 Principle 72 of the interpretive principles for the Covenant drafted by a group of international
legal experts in Maastricht, the Netherlands, in June of 1986, states that
a violation of the Covenant will occur if, inter alia, the state
deliberately retards or halts the progressive realization of a right, unless it
is acting within a limitation permitted by the Covenant
or it does so due to
3
a lack of available resources or Force majeure.' 1
Consequently, deliberately retrogressive measures in Canadian legislation with respect to social or economic rights protected by the Covenant
will violate Canada's commitment under the Covenant pursuant to
Article 2(1). This standard for the legitimacy of governmental action is
also a suitable standard by which Courts may judge either Parliament or
the provincial legislatures' compliance with their commitment to similar
social or economic concerns under s. 36(1) of the Constitution.
If Parliament and the provincial legislatures' commitment does indeed
have the strength of a "constitutional obligation", then deliberately
retrogressive measures in legislation will surely fall short of the obligation to promote, further or provide for concerns under (a), (b) and (c)
which Canada is internationally committed to realizing.
Conclusion

The inspiration for section 36 of the present ConstitutionAct, 1982 arose
in a dramatically bouyed political climate during the late 1960s and early
1970s. The Liberal government of Lester B. Pearson and Pierre E.
Trudeau presided over Canada's centennial in 1967 while ushering in a
new century of Canadian nationhood. Expo 67, the Centennial World Fair
Celebration hosted in Montreal, was both an international success and an
inspiration at home. A current of pride rippled through Canadians from
one end of the country to the other, and the Liberal government saw the

130. C. Scott, "Covenant Constitutionalism and the Canada Assistance Plan" (1995) 6(3)
Constit. Forum 79.
131. Ibid.at note 27. See "The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (1987) 9 Hum. Rts. Q. 122 at 131. See also
C. Scott & P. Macklem, "Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees? Social
Rights in a new South African Constitution" (1992) 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1; H. Karapuu & A.
Rosas, "Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Finland" in A. Rosas, ed., International
Human RightsNorms in Domestic Law: FinnishandPolish Perspectives(Dordrecht: Martinus

Nijhoff Publishers, 1995) at 195.
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opportunity as one to be seized. The federal government's initiatives
were broad in scope and focused on modernizing the country, as befitted
the spirit of renewal which attended Canada's centennial celebrations.
When Prime Minister Pearson turned over the helm of the federal
government to Prime Minister Trudeau in 1968, proposals for constitutional renewal were already on the table. The nation's rebirth, coming at
a time of relative prosperity for Canada, would be honoured by a new
Constitution, one drawn up by Canadians, for Canadians, and with a new
Canadian era ahead. This spirit of renewal had captured parliamentarians
and legislators as well as ordinary Canadians.
The newly elected, young and ambitious Prime Minister at this time
had already extricated the government from the "bedrooms of the nation"
in one civil libertarian effort to modernize the country. In the same spirit,
Prime Minister Trudeau responded to historical regional disparities
between provinces, between rural parts of the country and urban centers
and among individuals, by recognizing that such disparities were not
reflective of a modern, twentieth century nation:
There is no room in our society for great or widening disparitiesdisparities as between the opportunities available to individual Canadians,
or disparities in the opportunities or the public services available in the
several regions of Canada.'32

The project of equalizing opportunities for Canadians in fact had only just
been barely launched by 1968: the Canada Assistance Plan was initiated
in 1966, the Post Secondary Education Plan in 1967, and the Medical
Care Plan in 1968. These programmes were designed to provide essential
public services of a reasonable quality to all Canadians. By offering to pay
for half of all costs generated by the programmes, the federal government
"bought" conditions, or programme criteria, which it attached to the
various provincial programmes. Thus, because all provinces participated
in these programmes, and programme conditions were both significant
and the same for each province, Canadians were able-for the first
time-to benefit from high quality public services irrespective of the
geographic region in which they lived.
By 1982, s. 36 emerged as a very similar provision to the original
Article 46 of the 1971 Victoria Charter. Aside from the addition of
subsection (2) in 1979, Parliament, the Government of Canada and the
provincial governments and legislatures were still committed to the
promotion of equality of opportunity, the furtherance of economic
development, and the provision of essential public services of reasonable
quality to all Canadians, paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of s. 36(1).
132. Supra note 35.
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After all was said and done, the federal government was successful in
gaining sufficient constitutional authority for its spending power in
s. 36(1). As was recognized by the Alberta Court of Appeal in Winterhaven
Stables v. Canada,per Irving J.A.:

Moreover, as then Professor La Forest notes in The Allocation of Taxing
Powers Under the FederalConstitution, 2nd ed. (1981), at pp. 50-51,
payments to the provinces for provincial purposes are contemplated by the
ConstitutionAct, 1867. Such payments are also contemplated by s. 36(1)
of the Constitution Act, 1982 ...

133

Peter Hogg arrived at the same conclusion: By expressing a commitment
to redress regional disparities and to make equalization payments, section
36 of the Constitution Act, 1982, also seems to reinforce, by implication,
a broad interpretation of the spending power.'34 In addition to the
recognition of the spending power, of course, the federal government also
acquired, through the wording of this provision, a responsibility to the
people of Canada for meeting its commitment under this section. This is,
in fact, what the people of Canada gain from this provision: that the
federal government will promote equality of opportunity, further economic development, and provide essential public services of reasonable
quality to all Canadians, and will do so together in concert with the
provinces.
Under the current division of powers, the role of the federal government in its commitment pursuant to s. 36(l)(c) is the use of conditional
grants to ensure (i) the provision of essential public services which are
(ii) of a "reasonable quality", and (iii) are provided to "all Canadians".
Accordingly, the federal government is bound by its commitment to
require that essential public services be comprehensive and adequate,
thus ensuring their "reasonable quality", and that they be made universal,
accessible and free of a residency requirement, thus ensuring their
availability to "all Canadians". Only the federal government can effect
such a commitment for the nation as a whole, and it can only do so through
the device of conditional grants.135 If the federal government were to fail
(i) to meet standards of reasonable quality, or (ii) to serve all Canadians,
then the national government would have reneged on its commitment
pursuant to s. 36(l)(c). Since the spending power is the basis of federal
action under this section, and because conditional grants are the means by
which that power can be used to effect standards in public services nationwide, the federal government is constitutionally obligated by its

133. Winterhaven Stables v. Canada(1988), 53 D.L.R. (4th) 413 (Alta. C.A.) at 432.
134. Supra note 8 at 151.
135. Conditional grants or another, new device which will have the same result.
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commitment to maintain national standards at least in the areas of health
and welfare, pursuant to s. 36(1)(c). Those standards, of course, must be
of a reasonable quality.
Although a failure on the part of the federal government as described
above may or may not lead to a coercive remedy, the Courts have the
power to issue declaratory relief. 136With a declaration from the Court that
the federal government has failed to meet its commitment pursuant to
s. 36(1)(c), the government will be found to be have been acting unconstitutionally. Such a declaration in the context of s. 36(1)(c) is fitting. This
provision is ultimately about Canada's commitment to maintaining
national standards for individual social and economic protection"essential public services". This provision involves a political decision to
recognize constitutional, fundamental human rights; it is political, however, in terms not of legislative action, but of constitutional entrenchment. This 'decision' was made during the constitutional patriation
process by elected members of every level of government. The decision
to maintain national standards was entrenched in the ConstitutionAct,
1982 and it exists there pursuant to s. 36(l)(c). If a federal government
fails to meet its commitment under this provision, then its action must be
interpreted to mean that it is seeking to redraw the federal commitment
under this section. By issuing a declaration that the federal action in
question is unconstitutional pursuant to that government's commitment
under s. 36(1), the Court will be signalling to the federal government that
it is attempting to change the political resolution already arrived at when
s. 36(1) was constitutionally entrenched. If, despite an adverse ruling by
the Courts, the federal government continues to believe that its own
position on national standards should be the one to follow, then it will
have to return to the premiers and to the people of Canada for a new
constitutional debate to determine which approach to take with respect to
national standards. The choice will be between the 1982 constitutional
decision of federally maintained national standards of a reasonable
quality, or its own idea about the role of the national government in the
provision of public services.
As earlier stated, this is ultimately a political decision, one which must
be made by the body politic itself. If the federal government should wish
to deviate from its present constitutional commitment, then the question
would have to be decided by the people of Canada. Accordingly, a
declaration of unconstitutionality would be most appropriate, as the
Court itself would not be attempting to balance difficult political issues

136. Supra note 108.
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with respect to the spending power by seeking to coerce a solution. This
is not to say that the courts do not have a role to play in this process. The
courts are well situated to assess, or declare, whether federal legislation
complies with the constitutional requirements in s. 36(l)(c). If the federal
government wants to restructure the country by amending the Constitution through the political process, however, then that is what it should set
about doing but, in the meantime, it is bound by the Constitution. By not
compelling the federal government to rectify a legislative action in
violation of s. 36(1)(c), while declaring that action unconstitutional
pursuant to s. 36(1), the Court will effectively be returning the matter to
the political arena. This would force the federal government, unless it is
willing to remain in violation of the Constitution, either to fix the
offending legislation by amending it to comply with constitutional
norms, or to seek an amendment to its commitment under s. 36(1). The
process of amending the Constitution is that political process by which a
new public resolution may be made about Canada's continued commitment to national standards in essential public services. In a democracy
such as Canada, a declaration of unconstitutionality by the Courts would
thus be most fitting.
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APPENDIX A
HistoricalDrafts of Section 36
June 14-16, 1971
Fed-Prov. First Ministers' Conference, Victoria.
(the Victoria Charter)
Part VII, Regional Disparities
Art. 46. The Parliament and Government of Canada and the Legislatures
and Governments of the Provinces are committed to:
(1) the promotion of equality of opportunity and well being for all
individuals in Canada;
(2) the assurance, as nearly as possible, that essential public services
of reasonable quality are available to all individuals in Canada; and
(3) the promotion of economic development to reduce disparities in
the social and economic opportunities for all individuals in Canada
wherever they may live.
Art. 47. The provisions of this Part shall not have the effect of altering the
distribution of powers and shall not compel the Parliament of Canada or
Legislatures of the Provinces to exercise their legislative powers.
November 10, 1975
Draft Form for a Proclamation of the Governor General.
Part V, Regional Disparities
Art. 39. Without altering the distribution of powers and without compelling the Parliament of Canada or the Legislatures of the Provinces to
exercise their legislative powers, the Parliament of Canada and the
Legislatures of the Provinces, together with the Government of Canada
and the Governments of the Provinces, are committed to:
(a) the promotion of equality of opportunity and well-being for all
individuals in Canada;
(b) the assurance, as nearly as possible, that essential public services
of reasonable quality are available to all individuals in Canada; and
(c) the promotion of economic development to reduce disparities in
the social and economic opportunities for all individuals in Canada
wherever they may live.
[Article 40 has no bearing on Part V above]
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January 19, 1977
Draft Resolution Respecting the Constitution of Canada/
Proclamation Respecting the Constitution of Canada
Part IV - RegionalDisparities:

Art. 22. Without altering the distribution of powers and without compelling the Parliament of Canada or the Legislatures of the Provinces to
exercise their legislative powers, the Parliament of Canada and the
Legislatures of the Provinces, together with the Government of Canada
and the Governments of the Provinces, are committed to:
(a) the promotion of equality or opportunity and well-being for all
individuals in Canada;
(b) the assurance, as nearly as possible, that essential public services
of reasonable quality are available to all individuals in Canada; and
(c) the promotion of economic development to reduce disparities in
the social and economic opportunities for all individuals in Canada
wherever they may live.
June 20, 1978
The Constitution Amendment Bill (Bill C-60)
Part I, Provisions Respecting the Constitution of Canada;
II Statement of Aims of the Canadian Federation:
4. To these ends, the stated aims of the Canadian Federation shall be:
... to pursue social justice and economic opportunity for all Canadians
through the equitable sharing of the benefits and burdens of living in the
vast land that is their common inheritance, through the commitment of all
Canadians to the balanced development of the land of their common
inheritance and to the preservation of its richness and beauty in trust for
themselves and generations to come, and through their commitment to
overcome unacceptable disparities among Canadians in every region
including disparities in the basic public services available to them;
Part IX, Regional Disparities
96. Without limiting or restricting the generality of the statement of aims
of the Canadian Federation set forth in section 4 of this Act and without
altering the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada or of the
legislatures of the provinces or the rights of any of them with respect to
the exercise of their legislative authority pursuant to law, the Parliament
of Canada and the legislatures of the provinces, together with the
government of Canada and the governments of the provinces, are committed pursuant to the Constitution of Canada to
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(a) promoting equal opportunities for social and economic wellbeing,
(b) assuring as nearly as is practicable the availability of essential
public services of reasonable quality, and
(c) furthering economic development to reduce disparities in opportunities for social and economic well-being and in the availability of
essential public services of reasonable quality for the benefit of all
individuals in Canada, wherever they may live.
Explanatory Note:
96. This provision expresses a new commitment to promote equal
opportunities for social and economic well-being, assure essential public
services and promote the reduction of disparities in all regions of
Canada....
February 5-6, 1979
Fed-Prov. First Ministers' Conference, Ottawa.
"Best Effort" Draft Proposals, with Joint Government Input, Discussed
by First Ministers.
96(1) Without altering the legislative authority of Parliament or of the
Legislatures or of the rights of any of them with respect to the exercise of
their legislative authority, Parliament and the legislatures, together with
the Government of Canada and the Governments of the Provinces, are
committed to
(a) promoting equal opportunities for the well-being of Canadians;
(b) furthering economic development to reduce disparity in opportunities for social and economic well-being; and
(c) providing essential public services of reasonable quality to all
Canadians.
(2) Parliament and the Government of Canada are further committed to
the principle of making equalization payments to the provinces that are
unable to provide essential public services of reasonable quality without
imposing an undue burden of taxation, or to the principle of making
arrangements equivalent to equalization payments to meet the commitment specified in Section 96(1)(c).
(3) The Prime Minister of Canada and the First Ministers of the Provinces shall review together the questions of equalization and regional
development at least once every five years at a meeting convened
pursuant to section 97.
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October 6, 1980
Proposed Resolution for Joint Address to Her Majesty the Queen Respecting the Constitution of Canada.
Tabled in the House of Commons, Oct. 6, 1980.
Part 1I, Equalizationand Regional Disparities
31(1) Without altering the legislative authority of Parliament or of the
provincial legislatures, or the rights of any of them with respect to the
exercise of their legislative authority, Parliament and the legislatures,
together with the Government of Canada and the provincial governments,
are committed to
(a) promoting equal opportunities for the well-being of Canadians;
(b) furthering economic development to reduce disparity in opportunities; and
(c) providing essential public services of reasonable quality to all
Canadians.
(2) Parliament and the government of Canada are committed to taking
such measures as are appropriate to ensure that provinces are able to
provide the essential public services referred to in paragraph (1)(c)
without imposing an undue burden of provincial taxation.
Explanatory Notes:
31 (1) New. Subsection (1) would affirm the commitment by Parliament
and the provincial legislatures to promote equal opportunities, further
economic development and provide essential public services.
(2) New. Subsection (2) would affirm the commitment of the Parliament
and government of Canada to take measures to ensure the provision of
essential public services at reasonable levels of provincial taxation.
January 30, 1981
Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on the
Constitution of Canada.
Amendment tabled by Mr. Irwin on behalf of Fed. Gov't party. Amendment Passed.
31(2) Parliament and the government of Canada are committed to the
principle of making equalization payments to ensure that provincial
governments have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable
levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation.
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CONSTITUTION ACT, 1982
Part III, Equalization and Regional Disparities
36(1) Without altering the legislative authority of Parliament or of the
provincial legislatures, or the rights of any of them with respect to the
exercise of their legislative authority, Parliament and the legislatures,
together with the government of Canada and the provincial governments,
are committed to
(a) promoting equal opportunities for the well-being of Canadians;
(b) furthering economic development to reduce disparity in opportunities; and
(c) providing essential public services of reasonable quality to all
Canadians.
(2) Parliament and the government of Canada are committed to the
principle of making equalization payments to ensure that provincial
governments have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable
levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation.

